President Assad called me at home on 25/2/1984 at 1:45 a.m. and gave me the following instructions: “Put on your military uniform, head straight to your office in the Headquarters, mobilize the striking forces that are close to Damascus, raise their combat readiness to the fullest because Brigadier-General Rifaat had fully mobilized the Defense Brigades and was getting ready to control Damascus. Consequently, you have to take all the necessary measures to thwart his plans, and you should know that Rifaat is serious this time. I know that you do not fear anyone, but you should take into consideration that the confrontation is inevitable, and that the only option available to you is to notify him that the confrontation with the army would be a suicide operation to him and to all his followers.”
In a few minutes I was dressed in a field uniform and arrived at the Headquarters at 2:05 a.m. I immediately mobilized the brigade of mobile tank missiles whose degree of precision reaches a few meters. I also mobilized the anti-tank Brigade 65 led by Brigadier Ali Hormoz and Unit 549 (anti-tank brigades) led by Brigadier Adnan Al-Assad (President Assad’s nephew), in addition to mobilizing the First Division Commander General Ibrahim Safi, the Third Division Commander General Shafic Fayyad, the Seventh Division Commander Brigadier Ali Habib, and the Ninth Division Commander General Adnan Badr Al-Hassan. This measure was implemented in less than five minutes after which Lieutenant General Ali Duba and Major General Mohammad Al-Khawli arrived in my office successively. Each one of them said to me, “President Assad has put us at your disposal so that we fulfill the mission you were entrusted with.” I replied saying, “I have mobilized the aforementioned units and in front of you are the telephones on my desk. You have to mobilize the units that are close to Damascus.” My office looked like an operations room where each one of us talked to a formation commander and asked him to increase military preparedness to the fullest...
Thus, mobilization involved the other Headquarters reserve artillery brigades, the special mission brigades in the Intelligence Department, the military police brigades, and the air force intelligence detachments ... This means we did not leave a commander close to Damascus and commanding a fighting unit without increasing his military preparedness to the fullest extent, while we assured all officers that the president placed his absolute confidence in them.
I informed President Assad on the situation in the Army and told him that the units and formations close to Damascus were ready to be entrusted with any task. He thanked me for that accomplishment and recommended that I go on...
In this regard I should say a word about the president’s remembrance of the formations’ names and their numbers ... He did not skip mentioning a brigade, or a battalion, or a squad in the armed forces and asked for their mobilization. When I said to him, “Done, Sir” the phone would ring five minutes later and the speaker was certainly President Assad who reminded me of another unit. I would tell him that it had already been mobilized. The phone calls did not come to an end until 7 p.m. when I begged the president to rest and get some sleep. I said to him jokingly, “The Lord is the only one we haven’t mobilized yet!” He replied laughingly, “Because he is on our side. Well done.”
Lieutenant General Ali Duba and Major General Mohammad Al-Khawli went to sleep at 4 a.m. in their offices, so I was left alone in my office to receive the president’s calls. In one of them, I said to him, “It is true that we changed the Guard Battalion commander, but we are unaware of the trap set by Rifaat in the battalion. Similarly, the guard of the Regional Command (7) that is close to the Headquarters belongs to the Defense Brigades; therefore, security in the nearby area is not reassuring. Accordingly, do you permit the transfer of a regiment of the Special Units so that it will be a nearby reserve at my disposal?”
He said to me, “Can you do it without informing Major General Ali Haydar?” (The president was aware of the full coordination between his brother Rifaat and Ali Haydar) I replied that I could do it, and when he asked me about which commando regiment I would bring from Lebanon, I said, “Regiment 35 which is commanded by Brigadier Subhi Al-Tayyib and his Chief of Staff Colonel Muhsin Salman.”
He replied, “I doubt that you will successfully achieve this task!...”
I said to him, “I am certain of success as long as I am covered by your orders...”
He said, “You can enjoy full prerogatives on my behalf in this respect.”
And he wished me good luck.
In a few minutes I was dressed in a field uniform and arrived at the Headquarters at 2:05 a.m. I immediately mobilized the brigade of mobile tank missiles whose degree of precision reaches a few meters. I also mobilized the anti-tank Brigade 65 led by Brigadier Ali Hormoz and Unit 549 (anti-tank brigades) led by Brigadier Adnan Al-Assad (President Assad’s nephew), in addition to mobilizing the First Division Commander General Ibrahim Safi, the Third Division Commander General Shafic Fayyad, the Seventh Division Commander Brigadier Ali Habib, and the Ninth Division Commander General Adnan Badr Al-Hassan. This measure was implemented in less than five minutes after which Lieutenant General Ali Duba and Major General Mohammad Al-Khawli arrived in my office successively. Each one of them said to me, “President Assad has put us at your disposal so that we fulfill the mission you were entrusted with.” I replied saying, “I have mobilized the aforementioned units and in front of you are the telephones on my desk. You have to mobilize the units that are close to Damascus.” My office looked like an operations room where each one of us talked to a formation commander and asked him to increase military preparedness to the fullest...
Thus, mobilization involved the other Headquarters reserve artillery brigades, the special mission brigades in the Intelligence Department, the military police brigades, and the air force intelligence detachments ... This means we did not leave a commander close to Damascus and commanding a fighting unit without increasing his military preparedness to the fullest extent, while we assured all officers that the president placed his absolute confidence in them.
I informed President Assad on the situation in the Army and told him that the units and formations close to Damascus were ready to be entrusted with any task. He thanked me for that accomplishment and recommended that I go on...
In this regard I should say a word about the president’s remembrance of the formations’ names and their numbers ... He did not skip mentioning a brigade, or a battalion, or a squad in the armed forces and asked for their mobilization. When I said to him, “Done, Sir” the phone would ring five minutes later and the speaker was certainly President Assad who reminded me of another unit. I would tell him that it had already been mobilized. The phone calls did not come to an end until 7 p.m. when I begged the president to rest and get some sleep. I said to him jokingly, “The Lord is the only one we haven’t mobilized yet!” He replied laughingly, “Because he is on our side. Well done.”
Lieutenant General Ali Duba and Major General Mohammad Al-Khawli went to sleep at 4 a.m. in their offices, so I was left alone in my office to receive the president’s calls. In one of them, I said to him, “It is true that we changed the Guard Battalion commander, but we are unaware of the trap set by Rifaat in the battalion. Similarly, the guard of the Regional Command (7) that is close to the Headquarters belongs to the Defense Brigades; therefore, security in the nearby area is not reassuring. Accordingly, do you permit the transfer of a regiment of the Special Units so that it will be a nearby reserve at my disposal?”
He said to me, “Can you do it without informing Major General Ali Haydar?” (The president was aware of the full coordination between his brother Rifaat and Ali Haydar) I replied that I could do it, and when he asked me about which commando regiment I would bring from Lebanon, I said, “Regiment 35 which is commanded by Brigadier Subhi Al-Tayyib and his Chief of Staff Colonel Muhsin Salman.”
He replied, “I doubt that you will successfully achieve this task!...”
I said to him, “I am certain of success as long as I am covered by your orders...”
He said, “You can enjoy full prerogatives on my behalf in this respect.”
And he wished me good luck.
Let us start with the Major General, and let us review what he said straightforwardly in his book Three Months That Shook Syria. I will include the comments made by Syria’s Knights in the paragraphs that invite comments, right after the paragraphs in question. The comments start with (-) and will be written within a green frame.
The dismissal of Battalion 170 commander
One day in early February 1984, I went to my office in the Headquarters, and while I was passing near Al-Jahiz Park, I noticed that many pictures of Rifaat Al-Assad, the president’s brother, were stuck on the walls. In the pictures he raised his fist as a symbol of power and challenge... I was not relieved about this silly and harmful sight and said to myself that, since I had always been annoyed at it, President Hafez Al-Assad was certainly more annoyed, as he was the most concerned about this issue.
The introduction to the book
President Assad was the only person who followed up security issues relative to Unit 569 (the Defense Brigades). Whenever Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad realized that a security officer in his brigade dealt with the Intelligence Department, he would send him to the special brigade prison and no one would hear of him any more. Consequently, the unit constituted a special ghetto that was hard to penetrate.
Yet, some unit officers used to communicate information to President Hafez Al-Assad through top secret channels that Rifaat himself failed to uncover. President Assad became increasingly convinced that Rifaat was harboring something, and that the unit was in a state of permanent alert although the domestic conditions did not necessitate it...
Yet, some unit officers used to communicate information to President Hafez Al-Assad through top secret channels that Rifaat himself failed to uncover. President Assad became increasingly convinced that Rifaat was harboring something, and that the unit was in a state of permanent alert although the domestic conditions did not necessitate it...
- Therefore, the issue of the photos concerns the president, not the minister of defense, and despite his uneasiness about seeing the photos, he suppressed his anger and remained silent. Certainly, the reason is that the minister of defense lacked the courage to discuss the issue of the photos with Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad. But don’t worry sir, since “powerlessness does not imply weakness.”
- President Assad was the only person who followed up security issues relative to Unit 569 of the Defense Brigades, etc. In this regard, we can feel the major general’s embarrassment and confusion while he was writing down these words. It would have been much simpler for him to say that Unit 569, with all its constituents, was independent of the minister of defense. The latter was supposed to impose full control over all the army units; however, he did not resign. He did not even submit a slip of paper in protest. His attitude is justified in this connection. We realize that the decision to resign requires the determination of strong men and a will before which temptations cringe.
- This means that I did not understand how the president began to develop the conviction that Brigadier-General Rifaat was harboring something, for the mere existence of a state of alertness in the unit. Did the president’s spies, who were supposed to work in the unit, inform him about Brigadier-General Rifaat’s premeditated intention? As for the state of alertness, what is certain is that the Defense Brigades were placed in a state of permanent alertness from 1978 till 1984. Therefore, what was new?
- President Assad was the only person who followed up security issues relative to Unit 569 of the Defense Brigades, etc. In this regard, we can feel the major general’s embarrassment and confusion while he was writing down these words. It would have been much simpler for him to say that Unit 569, with all its constituents, was independent of the minister of defense. The latter was supposed to impose full control over all the army units; however, he did not resign. He did not even submit a slip of paper in protest. His attitude is justified in this connection. We realize that the decision to resign requires the determination of strong men and a will before which temptations cringe.
- This means that I did not understand how the president began to develop the conviction that Brigadier-General Rifaat was harboring something, for the mere existence of a state of alertness in the unit. Did the president’s spies, who were supposed to work in the unit, inform him about Brigadier-General Rifaat’s premeditated intention? As for the state of alertness, what is certain is that the Defense Brigades were placed in a state of permanent alertness from 1978 till 1984. Therefore, what was new?
In mid-February 1984, Leader Al-Assad ordered the transfer of Battalion 170 commander (*) that was entrusted with guarding the Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense. The Battalion commander was Colonel Salim Barakat, a follower of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad and one of his protégés. Rifaat had managed to convince President Assad of appointing this man (in spite of his discreditable conduct) during the period of Muslim Brothers activism in the late 1970s. Despite my awareness of this officer’s silliness, an opinion shared by Chief of Staff Hikmat Al-Shihabi and the Head of the Intelligence Department Ali Duba, we did not express our opinions freely and refrained from drawing the president’s attention to it, as we knew that Rifaat was behind that appointment while the security concern haunted the president’s mind; therefore, military prowess was relegated to a secondary place.
(*) By ordering the transfer, Leader Al-Assad aimed at protecting the Headquarters from Brigadier-General Rifaat’s direct control. Similarly, transferring the commander, who is a protégé of Rifaat occupying such a position in particular and under those circumstances, meant that President Hafez Al-Assad had the final say regarding the officers’ appointment. Transferring this officer was considered as the first step in rocking Rifaat Al-Assad’s citadel.
(*) By ordering the transfer, Leader Al-Assad aimed at protecting the Headquarters from Brigadier-General Rifaat’s direct control. Similarly, transferring the commander, who is a protégé of Rifaat occupying such a position in particular and under those circumstances, meant that President Hafez Al-Assad had the final say regarding the officers’ appointment. Transferring this officer was considered as the first step in rocking Rifaat Al-Assad’s citadel.
- Why didn’t you and your superiors draw the president’s attention to this officer’s “silliness”? Ah ... because the security concern haunted the president’s mind!!
Thus, the “silly officer” managed to provide the security cover to the Headquarters from the late 1970s till 1984, i.e. at the height of domestic unrest.
As for “non-silly” Major General Tlas, he concealed from the president one of the most important pieces of information that could help him make the right decision on appointing the unit commander entrusted with protecting the Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense.
- (*) Did the president personally say this to you? Well, we assume that this is the case. My question, Major General is: should we understand from your statement that “silly” Colonel Salim Barakat was the one who influenced the decisions taken by the Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense, including the appointment and transfer of officers? So, what would he have done if he had not been silly?
Thus, the “silly officer” managed to provide the security cover to the Headquarters from the late 1970s till 1984, i.e. at the height of domestic unrest.
As for “non-silly” Major General Tlas, he concealed from the president one of the most important pieces of information that could help him make the right decision on appointing the unit commander entrusted with protecting the Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense.
- (*) Did the president personally say this to you? Well, we assume that this is the case. My question, Major General is: should we understand from your statement that “silly” Colonel Salim Barakat was the one who influenced the decisions taken by the Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense, including the appointment and transfer of officers? So, what would he have done if he had not been silly?
Like the first step in a process, an order was issued to transfer the above mentioned officer on 19/2/1984 and to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Ali Younis in his position. On 18/2/1984 at 11 a.m. the transfer decision was communicated to the commander of Battalion 170 by Major General Hikmat Al-Shihabi who was his immediate superior. Lieutenant General Ali Duba was also notified by Major General Al-Shihabi that the battalion commander was totally prohibited from entering the Headquarters.
The commander of Battalion 170 left the Headquarters in a state of fury and headed straight to the Headquarters of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad in Al-Kabun where he complained to him. Al-Assad instructed him to return to the Headquarters in the evening to take over the command once again. He thought deep inside that Leader Al-Assad had issued an order to transfer fourteen officers considered his protégés at an earlier date, and that no one carried out the order. He also thought that the president kept quiet grudgingly, and had those officers not been his brother’s protégés, they would have faced the grim fate of imprisonment or dismissal from the army, at the very least.
When transferred Battalion Commander Salim Barakat returned to the Headquarters at 5 p.m., he was not prevented by the guards as they were his own men. He asked the brigade commander to convene the battalion soldiers in field uniforms. A few minutes later, after they had all gathered in the backyard, he addressed them by saying, “I was appointed as the battalion commander according to the instructions of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad, and I will not leave this battalion unless I receive orders from Leader Rifaat Al-Assad personally.”
Lieutenant General Ali Duba learnt about the issue from the new battalion commander, so he went to the battalion Headquarters immediately in his car and asked Colonel Asaad Sabbagh and his escort to follow him. He went up immediately to where Colonel Barakat was and addressed him by saying, “Everything is over now. You can no longer stay in this battalion. You have to leave immediately.”
Colonel Barakat yelled while he raised his gun: “Mr. General, please do not come close ...” to which Duba replied, “I will, son of a gun...”
At that moment, Colonel Sabbagh and his bodyguards (4 assistants armed with Russian rifles) arrived and disarmed Colonel Barakat. Lieutenant General Duba shouted at Major General Al-Shihabi that the issue was resolved... Then, he turned to Colonel Barakat and said, “Are you pointing your gun at me Salim? The latter replied, “Is it possible Abu Muhammad that I point my gun at you?” Then, Lieutenant General Duba slapped Colonel Barakat’s face and said, “I am Lieutenant General Duba, not Abu Muhammad, and I will take you to court Salim Barakat.” After that, Duba ordered that the lights be switched off, and ordered Colonel Asaad Sabbagh to get Colonel Barakat out of the car and to send him to the military police prison in Al-Kabun. The incident came to an end without uproar, and the number of the persons aware of its occurrence was limited.
The commander of Battalion 170 left the Headquarters in a state of fury and headed straight to the Headquarters of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad in Al-Kabun where he complained to him. Al-Assad instructed him to return to the Headquarters in the evening to take over the command once again. He thought deep inside that Leader Al-Assad had issued an order to transfer fourteen officers considered his protégés at an earlier date, and that no one carried out the order. He also thought that the president kept quiet grudgingly, and had those officers not been his brother’s protégés, they would have faced the grim fate of imprisonment or dismissal from the army, at the very least.
When transferred Battalion Commander Salim Barakat returned to the Headquarters at 5 p.m., he was not prevented by the guards as they were his own men. He asked the brigade commander to convene the battalion soldiers in field uniforms. A few minutes later, after they had all gathered in the backyard, he addressed them by saying, “I was appointed as the battalion commander according to the instructions of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad, and I will not leave this battalion unless I receive orders from Leader Rifaat Al-Assad personally.”
Lieutenant General Ali Duba learnt about the issue from the new battalion commander, so he went to the battalion Headquarters immediately in his car and asked Colonel Asaad Sabbagh and his escort to follow him. He went up immediately to where Colonel Barakat was and addressed him by saying, “Everything is over now. You can no longer stay in this battalion. You have to leave immediately.”
Colonel Barakat yelled while he raised his gun: “Mr. General, please do not come close ...” to which Duba replied, “I will, son of a gun...”
At that moment, Colonel Sabbagh and his bodyguards (4 assistants armed with Russian rifles) arrived and disarmed Colonel Barakat. Lieutenant General Duba shouted at Major General Al-Shihabi that the issue was resolved... Then, he turned to Colonel Barakat and said, “Are you pointing your gun at me Salim? The latter replied, “Is it possible Abu Muhammad that I point my gun at you?” Then, Lieutenant General Duba slapped Colonel Barakat’s face and said, “I am Lieutenant General Duba, not Abu Muhammad, and I will take you to court Salim Barakat.” After that, Duba ordered that the lights be switched off, and ordered Colonel Asaad Sabbagh to get Colonel Barakat out of the car and to send him to the military police prison in Al-Kabun. The incident came to an end without uproar, and the number of the persons aware of its occurrence was limited.
- Dear readers, note how the Major General related this incident in minute details, in a way that is not void of revenge and defamation targeting an officer holding a colonel rank.
So, finally the Major General and his Chief of Staff got rid of the “silly” Colonel who had protected them throughout the period of domestic unrest, thanks to Lieutenant General Ali Duba.
Despite my reservations about this story, I would have believed it (out of courtesy), had he not accused fourteen officers under the Leader’s command of rejecting or ignoring the orders of the President. This indicates Major General Mustafa Tlas’ lack of understanding of the President and of the Leader.
Hafez Al-Assad’s orders are not to be disobeyed in Syria, nor does Rifaat Al-Assad encourage his officers to ignore the president’s orders.
Perhaps the president ordered the transfer of a number of officers, but we cannot discard the possibility that the Leader interfered with the president to make him postpone the enforcement of the transfer order, or even have it revoked in accordance with the latest developments or any emergencies. This was reiterated not only in the Defense Brigades, but also in all the army units.
In this regard, dear readers, you can imagine the conditions prevailing at that time and the fomented strife that was about to kill hundreds of thousands of citizens later.
So, finally the Major General and his Chief of Staff got rid of the “silly” Colonel who had protected them throughout the period of domestic unrest, thanks to Lieutenant General Ali Duba.
Despite my reservations about this story, I would have believed it (out of courtesy), had he not accused fourteen officers under the Leader’s command of rejecting or ignoring the orders of the President. This indicates Major General Mustafa Tlas’ lack of understanding of the President and of the Leader.
Hafez Al-Assad’s orders are not to be disobeyed in Syria, nor does Rifaat Al-Assad encourage his officers to ignore the president’s orders.
Perhaps the president ordered the transfer of a number of officers, but we cannot discard the possibility that the Leader interfered with the president to make him postpone the enforcement of the transfer order, or even have it revoked in accordance with the latest developments or any emergencies. This was reiterated not only in the Defense Brigades, but also in all the army units.
In this regard, dear readers, you can imagine the conditions prevailing at that time and the fomented strife that was about to kill hundreds of thousands of citizens later.
The beginning of heated confrontation between the two parties
Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad did not find this measure palatable, so he decided to engage in a confrontation after he received advice from his friends at home and abroad, and particularly his friends (the long-lived ones) (*) who were directly inspired by the instructions coming from Washington. The US had unsuccessfully tried all means to control President Hafez Al-Assad’s independent decision-making that furthered Syrian interests and harmonized with those of the Arab nation. As a result, it saw it as an opportune moment to make its agents escalate the situation in the face of President Assad because his brother Rifaat would certainly be pliant regarding the White House policies and in contradiction to his brother, according to their calculations, information, and the information available to their friends (I mean the long-lived ones). As I said, President Assad was the only person in the armed forces who was holding the reins as regards some security matters in the Defense Brigades, and he made sure that the confrontation was inevitable and that Rifaat Al-Assad had been increasing military preparedness in the Defense Brigades for a week, i.e. the operation was serious and was not an experimental one meant to check the military preparedness of the brigades.
(*) What is meant is Prince Abdallah Bin Abdel Aziz, the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the First Deputy Premier, and the National Guard Commander ... For the sake of honesty, this man returned to the path of righteousness and became loyal to President Hafez Al-Assad after he discovered Rifaat’s hypocritical intentions.
(*) What is meant is Prince Abdallah Bin Abdel Aziz, the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the First Deputy Premier, and the National Guard Commander ... For the sake of honesty, this man returned to the path of righteousness and became loyal to President Hafez Al-Assad after he discovered Rifaat’s hypocritical intentions.
- Why did Prince Abdullah change his position later on when he discovered “the hypocritical intentions”?
Aren’t you saying that the long-lived incited Brigadier-General Rifaat to confrontation and that he was the one who advised him to engage in it?
It should be noted that King Abdullah, may God protect him, did not change his position, because very simply he did not interfere in Syria’s internal affairs.
(*) The relationships between the Leader and other Arab countries countries made jealous Major General Tlas sleepless due to his inability to establish any significant relationship with other parties outside the confines of his office. For this reason, he worked afoot destroy those relationships by discrediting them as conspiracies against the country at times, and by accusing people of being American agents at other times.
Aren’t you saying that the long-lived incited Brigadier-General Rifaat to confrontation and that he was the one who advised him to engage in it?
It should be noted that King Abdullah, may God protect him, did not change his position, because very simply he did not interfere in Syria’s internal affairs.
(*) The relationships between the Leader and other Arab countries countries made jealous Major General Tlas sleepless due to his inability to establish any significant relationship with other parties outside the confines of his office. For this reason, he worked afoot destroy those relationships by discrediting them as conspiracies against the country at times, and by accusing people of being American agents at other times.
- We will discover later on that the information communicated to the president that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad had planned to control Damascus was incorrect. So where did the president of the republic get the information from? Is there information at first? Or was there something else behind the issue?
We will also discover that at least 90% of the commanders who had been mobilized were supporters of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad.
At any rate, we will stick to the content of Tlas’ book and say:
here starts the process of uncovering the hypocrisy of the officials bearing grudges against Brigadier-General Rifaat and who communicated incorrect information to President Hafez Al-Assad, God’s mercy be upon him. Such grudges are certainly motivated by some reasons that we will state at a later stage.
We will also discover that at least 90% of the commanders who had been mobilized were supporters of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad.
At any rate, we will stick to the content of Tlas’ book and say:
here starts the process of uncovering the hypocrisy of the officials bearing grudges against Brigadier-General Rifaat and who communicated incorrect information to President Hafez Al-Assad, God’s mercy be upon him. Such grudges are certainly motivated by some reasons that we will state at a later stage.
The special units shift loyalty
One day, Brigadier Subhi Al-Tayyib and his Chief of Staff Colonel Muhsin Salman were in my office at 9 a.m. I briefed them on the situation by saying, “The security equation in the nearby area must be reversed. This will not take place at the hands of the military police, but rather at the hands of commando men experienced in fighting. Therefore, I ask you, on behalf of President Hafez Al-Assad, to order all the soldiers and officers under your command to head immediately from their stations to the Damascus International Fair.”
This was the spot I specified as the point to be approached by all due to its proximity to the Headquarters, and due to the fact that its numerous and spacious wings allow for the men’s accommodation without drawing anybody’s attention.
When Colonel Muhsin Salman asked me, “What should we do if the Defense Brigade Detachments from the brigades surrounding Damascus tried to prevent us?”
I answered, “Our movements should focus on passing cars individually, and they should be made by shelter vehicles, on condition that the vehicles do not constitute any queue at all. When you face the soldiers of the Defense Brigades, you have to hit them with the rifle butts. And if they keep resisting, you treat them with hostility and point at them the rifles’ muzzles from which emanates political power in revolutionary struggles, as comrade (Mao Tse-Tung) said. Then, you will see them escape the confrontation because your will to fight is much stronger, and because you are the defenders of the authorities while they are the outlaws.”
Finally, Brigadier Subhi Al-Tayyib and Colonel Muhsin Salman asked me the question: “Well, what shall we say to Major General Ali Haydar if he inquires about the reason behind dispatching our forces to Damascus without notifying him?”
I said to them, “The answer is very simple. You say that Major General Tlas asked for you, but did not find you. And since the situation is critical, he summoned us to his office and asked us to carry out Assad’s instructions, so we acted accordingly...”
I shook hands with them and wished them good luck. The regiment commander and his chief of staff headed for Anjar and performed the mission perfectly.
Major General Hikmat Al-Shihabi and Major General Ali Aslan came at 9:30 a.m., where I put them in the picture and said, “The reason why you were not summoned is that first, the alertness operation had to be implemented secretly whereby the operations division would only learn about it later and Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad would not be informed about the issue. On the other hand, this cost me only a couple of phone calls I made with the squad commanders and the unit commanders, while you are definitely considered as standing by President Assad.” They replied saying, “This issue is beyond discussion as we support Leader Al-Assad for better or for worse.”
I tried to get some sleep at 4:30 p.m. after I had worked for fourteen consecutive hours, but my office administrator sent me a slip of paper in which he informed me that Major General Ali Haydar wished to see me ... I said to him, “Let him come in.”
I received him as usual, but I noticed that there were signs of uneasiness on his face. He said to me, “Sir, what have I done to you and to the president so that you treat me like the deluded husband, i.e. I am the last person to learn about what is going on?”
President Assad had devised a plan for me to deal with such emergencies ... I said to him clearly, “If you really stand by us, you should call Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad from my office and tell him openly about your position. Only then, will I call the president in front of you and I will send you immediately to see him in order to have a clarification about any ambiguous point in the president’s mind.”
He said to me, “Call Brigadier-General Rifaat right now...”
I called him immediately on the direct line and we were connected in a few seconds.
I said to him, “Abu Durayd, Major General Ali Haydar wants to talk to you.”
He asked me, “Is he in your office?”
I answered, “Certainly.”
He said to me, “I have been looking vainly for him since the morning.”
When I gave him the receiver, Major General Haydar said to him, “Abu Durayd, don’t you know that in this country there is only one leader who is President Hafez Al-Assad?... How did soldiers from the Defense Brigades do such outrageous acts that breach the discipline of the Armed Forces (*)?”
Brigadier-General Rifaat replied saying, “Do you mean now to lecture me on nationalism, you damned man.”
As he slammed down the receiver, Major General Ali Haydar said to me, “He insulted me and slammed down the receiver.”
I said to him, “Now the truth is ascertained...”
I called His Excellency the President and when I informed him about the incident, he said to me, “Send him right now to the presidential palace.”
He left my office for the palace where the Special Units’ loyalty to President Assad was proven. Haydar put into practice the maxim of the Commander of the Faithful that goes: “Returning to righteousness is better than going to extremes of falsity.”
(*) It was a nice coincidence that Lieutenant General Ali Duba was at that moment paying a fact-finding visit to Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad during which he heard the conversation live.
This was the spot I specified as the point to be approached by all due to its proximity to the Headquarters, and due to the fact that its numerous and spacious wings allow for the men’s accommodation without drawing anybody’s attention.
When Colonel Muhsin Salman asked me, “What should we do if the Defense Brigade Detachments from the brigades surrounding Damascus tried to prevent us?”
I answered, “Our movements should focus on passing cars individually, and they should be made by shelter vehicles, on condition that the vehicles do not constitute any queue at all. When you face the soldiers of the Defense Brigades, you have to hit them with the rifle butts. And if they keep resisting, you treat them with hostility and point at them the rifles’ muzzles from which emanates political power in revolutionary struggles, as comrade (Mao Tse-Tung) said. Then, you will see them escape the confrontation because your will to fight is much stronger, and because you are the defenders of the authorities while they are the outlaws.”
Finally, Brigadier Subhi Al-Tayyib and Colonel Muhsin Salman asked me the question: “Well, what shall we say to Major General Ali Haydar if he inquires about the reason behind dispatching our forces to Damascus without notifying him?”
I said to them, “The answer is very simple. You say that Major General Tlas asked for you, but did not find you. And since the situation is critical, he summoned us to his office and asked us to carry out Assad’s instructions, so we acted accordingly...”
I shook hands with them and wished them good luck. The regiment commander and his chief of staff headed for Anjar and performed the mission perfectly.
Major General Hikmat Al-Shihabi and Major General Ali Aslan came at 9:30 a.m., where I put them in the picture and said, “The reason why you were not summoned is that first, the alertness operation had to be implemented secretly whereby the operations division would only learn about it later and Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad would not be informed about the issue. On the other hand, this cost me only a couple of phone calls I made with the squad commanders and the unit commanders, while you are definitely considered as standing by President Assad.” They replied saying, “This issue is beyond discussion as we support Leader Al-Assad for better or for worse.”
I tried to get some sleep at 4:30 p.m. after I had worked for fourteen consecutive hours, but my office administrator sent me a slip of paper in which he informed me that Major General Ali Haydar wished to see me ... I said to him, “Let him come in.”
I received him as usual, but I noticed that there were signs of uneasiness on his face. He said to me, “Sir, what have I done to you and to the president so that you treat me like the deluded husband, i.e. I am the last person to learn about what is going on?”
President Assad had devised a plan for me to deal with such emergencies ... I said to him clearly, “If you really stand by us, you should call Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad from my office and tell him openly about your position. Only then, will I call the president in front of you and I will send you immediately to see him in order to have a clarification about any ambiguous point in the president’s mind.”
He said to me, “Call Brigadier-General Rifaat right now...”
I called him immediately on the direct line and we were connected in a few seconds.
I said to him, “Abu Durayd, Major General Ali Haydar wants to talk to you.”
He asked me, “Is he in your office?”
I answered, “Certainly.”
He said to me, “I have been looking vainly for him since the morning.”
When I gave him the receiver, Major General Haydar said to him, “Abu Durayd, don’t you know that in this country there is only one leader who is President Hafez Al-Assad?... How did soldiers from the Defense Brigades do such outrageous acts that breach the discipline of the Armed Forces (*)?”
Brigadier-General Rifaat replied saying, “Do you mean now to lecture me on nationalism, you damned man.”
As he slammed down the receiver, Major General Ali Haydar said to me, “He insulted me and slammed down the receiver.”
I said to him, “Now the truth is ascertained...”
I called His Excellency the President and when I informed him about the incident, he said to me, “Send him right now to the presidential palace.”
He left my office for the palace where the Special Units’ loyalty to President Assad was proven. Haydar put into practice the maxim of the Commander of the Faithful that goes: “Returning to righteousness is better than going to extremes of falsity.”
(*) It was a nice coincidence that Lieutenant General Ali Duba was at that moment paying a fact-finding visit to Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad during which he heard the conversation live.
- Major General Mustafa Tlas describes Major General Ali Haydar as being loyal to Brigadier-General Rifaat and as fully coordinating with him. Such coordination necessitates the exchange of information and the approval by both parties of a certain work agenda. But it seems in this respect, and in the words of Tlas that Haydar “was the last person to be informed!!” So how can the truthfulness of your statements be proven Major General?
As for the move of Colonel Muhsin Salman’s forces from Beirut to Damascus, it would not have happened had the Defense Brigades commander not been aware. “You know Tlas, that they were all arrested at the entrance of Damascus by the Defense Brigades patrols, and they were imprisoned for 24 hours before the Defense Brigades commander ordered their release, so why didn’t you mention these details here?”
Major General Tlas addresses Rifaat by calling him “my brother”, while the latter kept working for 24 hours on mobilizing the forces against “his brother”.
As for Major General Ali Haydar’s call, we assert that this call was not made at all. It was rather Major General Tlas who called and said to Brigadier-General Rifaat, “Fellow Abu Durayd, Major General Ali Haydar is in my office, and we hope you will reconsider your decisions.” Brigadier- General Rifaat said, “Damn you and your decisions, you son of a gun.” And he slammed down the receiver.
(*) Major General Tlas tells us about an anticipated confrontation and a tense atmosphere. At the same time, Brigadier-General Rifaat receives Lieutenant General Ali Duba, lets him “carry out an exploration”, and heartily answers the phone call made by Major General Tlas. So are we facing a tense atmosphere on one side?
As for the move of Colonel Muhsin Salman’s forces from Beirut to Damascus, it would not have happened had the Defense Brigades commander not been aware. “You know Tlas, that they were all arrested at the entrance of Damascus by the Defense Brigades patrols, and they were imprisoned for 24 hours before the Defense Brigades commander ordered their release, so why didn’t you mention these details here?”
Major General Tlas addresses Rifaat by calling him “my brother”, while the latter kept working for 24 hours on mobilizing the forces against “his brother”.
As for Major General Ali Haydar’s call, we assert that this call was not made at all. It was rather Major General Tlas who called and said to Brigadier-General Rifaat, “Fellow Abu Durayd, Major General Ali Haydar is in my office, and we hope you will reconsider your decisions.” Brigadier- General Rifaat said, “Damn you and your decisions, you son of a gun.” And he slammed down the receiver.
(*) Major General Tlas tells us about an anticipated confrontation and a tense atmosphere. At the same time, Brigadier-General Rifaat receives Lieutenant General Ali Duba, lets him “carry out an exploration”, and heartily answers the phone call made by Major General Tlas. So are we facing a tense atmosphere on one side?
At 7 p.m. I learnt that 2000 officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers from the Special Units had already been stationed at the Damascus International Fair. Consequently, security conditions near the Army Headquarters improved and the equation was reversed to our advantage as far as the balance of power and means were concerned.
Not contenting myself with this, I asked Brigadier Adnan Al-Assad to send two m/d brigades, the first being Malotka and the second of the Fagot type. They were stationed on the Headquarters roof, thereby making the Headquarters a reinforced citadel that could not be invaded.
Not contenting myself with this, I asked Brigadier Adnan Al-Assad to send two m/d brigades, the first being Malotka and the second of the Fagot type. They were stationed on the Headquarters roof, thereby making the Headquarters a reinforced citadel that could not be invaded.
The formation of the republican guard
It was necessary to issue an order to form the Republican Guard in order to make the military forces in particular, and the rest of the people in general, understand that it was the duty of the Republican Guard to ensure the protection of the presidential palace, and that the Defense Brigades no longer had any role in protecting the President. We agreed that the Republican Guard would consist of an armored division to which were added three guard regiments whose cadres were similar to those of the commando regiments of the Special Units. And in order to set the Republican Guard on solid foundations from the start, I suggested to the President that we bring ready units straight from the divisions and military formations. For instance, we could bring an infantry battalion, or a tank battalion, or an artillery battalion from any division. Its readiness would not be affected and it was easy to form another battalion from within. Thus, the name of the unit that would join the Republican Guard appeared in the formation order for the first time... Rifaat Al-Assad attempted to hinder this formation, which he considered a blow dealt to him, and he forcefully prevented some battalions from joining the Republican Guard, but the tank units managed to break the siege laid to the guard and joined the formation. The 259th Battalion, 81st Brigade, the 3rd Division was the first to join. I feel proud that this battalion was the first tank battalion whose command I assumed in Homs after the glorious March 8 Revolution. Thus, the Republican Guard began to gradually stand on its feet in order to fulfill its noble task.
- Why all this hostility toward the Defense Brigades, Minister of Defense?
If the president, the Headquarters, and the Ministry of Defense (i.e. all the power holders) were under the protection of the Defense Brigades from the early 1970s till 1984, and if they perfectly did their duties, as evidenced by the fact that the president, you and people in similar positions were kept from harm despite the fierce civil war with the Muslim Brothers, should the Defense Brigades be rewarded by conspiring against them and their commander?
On the other hand, had the commander of the Defense Brigades harbored “hypocritical intentions” as you claim, and since you were under the protection of these brigades, couldn’t the commander of the Defense Brigades practically kill you/break you neck and your peers at any time?
- You are proud because you brought the first battalion whose control you assumed in order to join the Republican Guard... This is you.
As for us in the Defense Brigades, we take pride in the fact that we are the ones who liberated Al-Kuneitra from Israeli occupation, that we fought the Israeli army in Lebanon, that we defended Syria and its president, and that we have ensured stability in Syria after it had been left in the hands of fate.
If the president, the Headquarters, and the Ministry of Defense (i.e. all the power holders) were under the protection of the Defense Brigades from the early 1970s till 1984, and if they perfectly did their duties, as evidenced by the fact that the president, you and people in similar positions were kept from harm despite the fierce civil war with the Muslim Brothers, should the Defense Brigades be rewarded by conspiring against them and their commander?
On the other hand, had the commander of the Defense Brigades harbored “hypocritical intentions” as you claim, and since you were under the protection of these brigades, couldn’t the commander of the Defense Brigades practically kill you/break you neck and your peers at any time?
- You are proud because you brought the first battalion whose control you assumed in order to join the Republican Guard... This is you.
As for us in the Defense Brigades, we take pride in the fact that we are the ones who liberated Al-Kuneitra from Israeli occupation, that we fought the Israeli army in Lebanon, that we defended Syria and its president, and that we have ensured stability in Syria after it had been left in the hands of fate.
Smuggling anti-tank arms in the ambulance
President Assad’s house was the first target of the Defense Brigades; therefore, it was for me a security concern that made me sleepless day and night... But this concern was for Brigadier Adnan Makhlouf (who was appointed the commander of the Republican Guard) an intolerable nightmare. And since the Unit of the Struggle Companies led by Adnan Al-Assad was likely to clash immediately with the soldiers of the Defense Brigades that were about to head for Damascus, I thought it was better that we withdrew the Fagot missiles from Brigade 65 m/d. And as Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad had deployed his brigades surrounding Damascus and was in control of the city entrances, I agreed with Brigadier Adnan on smuggling the missiles in ambulances to President Assad’s house where he had to unload the cargo and return the vehicles to their source... I called Brigadier Hermoz, the brigade commander and asked him to bring 18 missile bases of the Fagot type with 3 fire units for each base, and I also asked him to send them to President Assad’s house in batches (individual vehicles), wrap a white bandage around a soldier’s hand and head and use mercurochrome as a substitute for running blood. The brigade commander understood the objective of the trick. I said to him, “You have to order the ambulance driver to sound the emergency siren before he reaches the checkpoint, and to drive at top speed on his way to Damascus...” Thus, Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad was fooled and all the required missile bases were moved to the surroundings of President Assad’s house ... But the issue did not remain a secret only kept by the three of us; the information was rather shared by Rifaat after one of his agents, Major Youssef Al-Ali of Brigade 65 divulged the secret to him. This idiot revealed himself quickly, so Brigadier Hermoz placed him under close surveillance. As soon as Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad left for Moscow, he was transferred to a post of secondary importance where he could not bite or scratch. He was also classified as one of the officers who have not earned the Headquarters’ trust. In addition, hedgehog iron roadblocks were put around the president’s house, which hindered tank movement and made them a fixed antitank target, thereby completing the fortification of the nation Leader’s home and its well-beloved symbol.
- So, after the president’s house was under the protection of the Defense Brigades, it became the latter’s first target overnight!!!
Who are you lying to, deceiver??? God or the nation???
- Dear readers, note how the Defense Brigades are the ones that “control the entrances to Damascus”. Major General Tlas did not say that they had been protecting Damascus and its entrances by having their forces stationed at the capital outskirts.
- Reference to missile smuggling (in our case) is too silly to be uttered by the defense minister of a respectable state. But as it was made by our minister, we tell him that we wish he had used his genius to smuggle the missiles to the Syrian contingent that was besieged by the Israeli Army in 1982 in Lebanon.
- Major Youssef Al-Ali was transferred to a post where he could not “bite”!!
This is what our defense minister is up to saying.
Who are you lying to, deceiver??? God or the nation???
- Dear readers, note how the Defense Brigades are the ones that “control the entrances to Damascus”. Major General Tlas did not say that they had been protecting Damascus and its entrances by having their forces stationed at the capital outskirts.
- Reference to missile smuggling (in our case) is too silly to be uttered by the defense minister of a respectable state. But as it was made by our minister, we tell him that we wish he had used his genius to smuggle the missiles to the Syrian contingent that was besieged by the Israeli Army in 1982 in Lebanon.
- Major Youssef Al-Ali was transferred to a post where he could not “bite”!!
This is what our defense minister is up to saying.