Ali Eid sends a detachment of thieves to plunder Damascus
One day in early April 1984 I received a phone call around 4 p.m. from our forces commander in Tripoli Brigadier Sleiman Hassan who informed me that Ali Eid prepared a detachment of thieves made up of 200 men and 20 different vehicles, and armed with Kalashnikov rifles, 7 RPG anti-tank grenade launchers, grenades, and guns. There was a tacit agreement with Abou Durayd regarding Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad. Accordingly, this group would participate in robbing jewelry shops, particularly in Damascus when the zero hour comes to desecrate the city. After that, they would escape with the stolen goods to Lebanon (Tripoli of Damascus) where the division of the spoils would take place.
I immediately called the air defense commander of the central area Ahmad Ghmeid, and I entrusted him with the task of arresting the thieves.
I said to him, “If you are unable to confront them, I am willing to give orders to the Director of the Tank Academy Farouk ´Issa so that he puts at your disposal a tank brigade from the data processing regiment.”
He replied saying, “There is no need for that as I can confront and arrest them.”
A quarter of an hour later, General Ghmeid called me and said, “The thieves slipped out to Damascus and we couldn’t arrest them.”
I said to the division commander, “Didn’t I tell you to notify me in case you were unable to carry out the operation so that I assign the task to somebody else?!”
He replied to me saying, “Sir, they slipped out, they slipped out. (**) We were helpless.”
I ended the conversation and immediately called General Shafic Fayyad, the commander of the 3rd armored tank division stationed in Al-Katifa and I entrusted him with the task of arresting the thieves. I also asked him to move a mechanized infantry brigade of the 20th company, and to station an armored vehicle at the Ma´loula bifurcation, another at the old axis, and the rest of vehicles at the main axis. I also asked that communication be maintained through eye contact among everybody.
He replied saying, “Sir, let me take care of the details and you will hear good news in less than two hours.”
The thieves’ arrival in Damascus would have stained the reputation of the armed forces had they managed to penetrate all the security checkpoints on the road. It is true that they raised the party banners and slogans and Rifaat Al-Assad’s pictures on their cars, but this did not change the truth about their being despicable thieves that must never be allowed to enter Damascus and practice the sabotage and plunder they had previously practiced in Beirut. There they called themselves “The Baath Knights” while they were a mix of the Defense Brigades and Ali Eid’s men who had withdrawn from Beirut to Tripoli without confronting the Israeli forces during the invasion of the Lebanese capital in summer 1982.
Consequently, our valiant armed forces do not respect them at all, but rather despise them.
Exactly half an hour later, General Shafic Fayyad called to notify me that the task was successful and that the thieves were arrested after they had been disarmed and their cars had been confiscated.
I said to General Fayyad, “They must receive a degrading treatment similar to the one given to mangy camels by scabby Bedouins, and to stray dogs by farmers.
He said, “You don’t need to advise a complying person. They are put under the tight supervision of the revolutionaries. They will face severe punishment and will be spanked after they are hosed so that they will never forget this incident in their life.”
The robbers were detained for over a month and were not released until after the crisis was over and Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad traveled to Moscow.
(*) After the problem was resolved, General Fawzi ´Arnous, the division deputy commander, assured me that he was assigned by General Ghmeid to carry out the task and that he managed to arrest the head of a convoy of thieves. He was putting on his shoulder a chevron of a first lieutenant in the Lebanese army, which was undoubtedly a fake one. After he took him to the division commander and Lieutenant Colonel Aref Karnoub, the Deputy Head of the military intelligence services in the central area, both said to him, “Go to your place. You mission has come to an end.” They discussed the issue and decided to duck responsibility in the event Rifaat Al-Assad succeeded in controlling Damascus. For this reason, they allowed the commander of the thieves’ detachment to carry on with his march to the Syrian capital.
I immediately called the air defense commander of the central area Ahmad Ghmeid, and I entrusted him with the task of arresting the thieves.
I said to him, “If you are unable to confront them, I am willing to give orders to the Director of the Tank Academy Farouk ´Issa so that he puts at your disposal a tank brigade from the data processing regiment.”
He replied saying, “There is no need for that as I can confront and arrest them.”
A quarter of an hour later, General Ghmeid called me and said, “The thieves slipped out to Damascus and we couldn’t arrest them.”
I said to the division commander, “Didn’t I tell you to notify me in case you were unable to carry out the operation so that I assign the task to somebody else?!”
He replied to me saying, “Sir, they slipped out, they slipped out. (**) We were helpless.”
I ended the conversation and immediately called General Shafic Fayyad, the commander of the 3rd armored tank division stationed in Al-Katifa and I entrusted him with the task of arresting the thieves. I also asked him to move a mechanized infantry brigade of the 20th company, and to station an armored vehicle at the Ma´loula bifurcation, another at the old axis, and the rest of vehicles at the main axis. I also asked that communication be maintained through eye contact among everybody.
He replied saying, “Sir, let me take care of the details and you will hear good news in less than two hours.”
The thieves’ arrival in Damascus would have stained the reputation of the armed forces had they managed to penetrate all the security checkpoints on the road. It is true that they raised the party banners and slogans and Rifaat Al-Assad’s pictures on their cars, but this did not change the truth about their being despicable thieves that must never be allowed to enter Damascus and practice the sabotage and plunder they had previously practiced in Beirut. There they called themselves “The Baath Knights” while they were a mix of the Defense Brigades and Ali Eid’s men who had withdrawn from Beirut to Tripoli without confronting the Israeli forces during the invasion of the Lebanese capital in summer 1982.
Consequently, our valiant armed forces do not respect them at all, but rather despise them.
Exactly half an hour later, General Shafic Fayyad called to notify me that the task was successful and that the thieves were arrested after they had been disarmed and their cars had been confiscated.
I said to General Fayyad, “They must receive a degrading treatment similar to the one given to mangy camels by scabby Bedouins, and to stray dogs by farmers.
He said, “You don’t need to advise a complying person. They are put under the tight supervision of the revolutionaries. They will face severe punishment and will be spanked after they are hosed so that they will never forget this incident in their life.”
The robbers were detained for over a month and were not released until after the crisis was over and Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad traveled to Moscow.
(*) After the problem was resolved, General Fawzi ´Arnous, the division deputy commander, assured me that he was assigned by General Ghmeid to carry out the task and that he managed to arrest the head of a convoy of thieves. He was putting on his shoulder a chevron of a first lieutenant in the Lebanese army, which was undoubtedly a fake one. After he took him to the division commander and Lieutenant Colonel Aref Karnoub, the Deputy Head of the military intelligence services in the central area, both said to him, “Go to your place. You mission has come to an end.” They discussed the issue and decided to duck responsibility in the event Rifaat Al-Assad succeeded in controlling Damascus. For this reason, they allowed the commander of the thieves’ detachment to carry on with his march to the Syrian capital.
- Let me refute this scenario in detail. As I do not want to anticipate the results, I will deal with this tale as if it were true, and as if there were an armed gang about to enter the country. Let us see how the minister of defense will resist it.
- Thieves use cars, and in spite of this General Tlas first called the commander of the Air Defense Division! It is certainly known that air defense deals with air targets and it unable to deal with land targets.
Wanting to inform us that he was vigilant to this issue, and making matters worse, the General discussed with the commander of the Air Defense Division the possibility of seeking the support of a tank brigade from the data processing regiment of the tank Academy. To those who are not familiar with the concept of data processing, I say that in each military academy there is a data brigade or battalion, depending on the needs of the academy. It has the major tools that help the students put into practice the theories they learn, and these tools are known as the training aides. And to those who are unfamiliar with the data regiment of the tank academy, I say that in this battalion no tank is ready for use. The tanks consist of remnants of the 1973 War, and the students are hardly allowed to sit in them and touch the equipment. And if it happens that they really move, they break down after advancing three kilometers.
By God, look at this General who wants to face a gang moving on the ground and equipped with RPG anti-tank weapons, by using the air defense units on the one hand, and the training aides of the military academy on the other hand.
This is one of the shortcomings of relying on loyalty before merit as a basis for appointing the leading cadres to senior civil service positions. There is a double injustice in this respect: injustice to the competent persons first, and to the citizens who bear the consequences of incompetent leaders’ acts second.
So the bandits slipped out! The bandits, about whom General Tlas says they are despised by our valiant forces, keep marching, as the general says in the first footnote, with the help of the commander of the air defense division and the deputy head of the military intelligence! It is not unlikely that the deputy division commander is well inclined to help those bandits. In addition, does the deputy head of the military intelligence act without the approval of the head of the department? Certainly not.
If at least two out of three of the commanders of the central zone forgot to deal with Ali Eid’s men as they are despicable bandits, according to Tlas’ allegations, then who is the despicable person in this regard? I leave it up to the readers to decide.
Furthermore, if two out of three of the commanders of the central zone bet that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad will win, does this shed light on the size of the armed forces rally around Rifaat’s leadership? The answer to this question should be given by Tlas himself.
We carry on by referring to more cases.
General Shafic Fayyad succeeded in arresting Ali Eid’s men and the story came to an end.
Can you, dear readers, note the non-interference of the Defense Brigades forces surrounding Damascus to offer assistance to Ali Eid’s group in reaching the Syrian capital?
Is it not strange that we haven’t seen yet any interference or reaction on the part of the Defense Brigades in all the tales and incidents related by General Tlas so far?
- Thieves use cars, and in spite of this General Tlas first called the commander of the Air Defense Division! It is certainly known that air defense deals with air targets and it unable to deal with land targets.
Wanting to inform us that he was vigilant to this issue, and making matters worse, the General discussed with the commander of the Air Defense Division the possibility of seeking the support of a tank brigade from the data processing regiment of the tank Academy. To those who are not familiar with the concept of data processing, I say that in each military academy there is a data brigade or battalion, depending on the needs of the academy. It has the major tools that help the students put into practice the theories they learn, and these tools are known as the training aides. And to those who are unfamiliar with the data regiment of the tank academy, I say that in this battalion no tank is ready for use. The tanks consist of remnants of the 1973 War, and the students are hardly allowed to sit in them and touch the equipment. And if it happens that they really move, they break down after advancing three kilometers.
By God, look at this General who wants to face a gang moving on the ground and equipped with RPG anti-tank weapons, by using the air defense units on the one hand, and the training aides of the military academy on the other hand.
This is one of the shortcomings of relying on loyalty before merit as a basis for appointing the leading cadres to senior civil service positions. There is a double injustice in this respect: injustice to the competent persons first, and to the citizens who bear the consequences of incompetent leaders’ acts second.
So the bandits slipped out! The bandits, about whom General Tlas says they are despised by our valiant forces, keep marching, as the general says in the first footnote, with the help of the commander of the air defense division and the deputy head of the military intelligence! It is not unlikely that the deputy division commander is well inclined to help those bandits. In addition, does the deputy head of the military intelligence act without the approval of the head of the department? Certainly not.
If at least two out of three of the commanders of the central zone forgot to deal with Ali Eid’s men as they are despicable bandits, according to Tlas’ allegations, then who is the despicable person in this regard? I leave it up to the readers to decide.
Furthermore, if two out of three of the commanders of the central zone bet that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad will win, does this shed light on the size of the armed forces rally around Rifaat’s leadership? The answer to this question should be given by Tlas himself.
We carry on by referring to more cases.
General Shafic Fayyad succeeded in arresting Ali Eid’s men and the story came to an end.
Can you, dear readers, note the non-interference of the Defense Brigades forces surrounding Damascus to offer assistance to Ali Eid’s group in reaching the Syrian capital?
Is it not strange that we haven’t seen yet any interference or reaction on the part of the Defense Brigades in all the tales and incidents related by General Tlas so far?
The Murshidi community declares loyalty to Mr. President
Fellow Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Ali, the commander of the Popular Army had reached an agreement with Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad early on. This issue was totally insignificant before the crisis because many liars, especially the members of the Higher Studies League, were swarming around Brigadier-General Al-Assad as crows roam around dead animals.
Our fellow the commander of the Popular Army used to walk around extensively and look for new pieces of news after the March 8 Revolution. He still keeps this habit although over 14 years have elapsed since the Corrective Movement. He would drop by my office once a week and ask me about the situation. I would reassure him that it was ok. For the sake of historical accuracy, I would say that the Headquarters officers did not esteem fellow Abou Nada. President Assad and I were the only persons in the Headquarters who were aware of Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Ali’s struggle and sacrifices for the sake of the party and the revolution, starting with the Free Officers Movement in Aleppo up to the February 23rd Movement. This situation was very painful for fellow Mohammad who, as a result, would visit them once in a while.
After the momentous incident, I closed my office in the face of the Popular Army commander. Although he asked to see me several times, I always apologized. But as he insisted, I finally agreed. When he came, he astonishingly inquired about my position on him.
I said to him, “There are no half solutions when it comes to such issues. You either side with President Assad, or you are on the other front.”
He said, “I support President Hafez Al-Assad, and in order to dispel doubt with certainty, I am ready to bring the sons of Lord Sleiman Murshid from Homs and Joubat Al-Berghal to see Mr. President.”
I said to him, “What is the relevance of the Murshidi community in the crisis?”
He said to me, “Don’t you know that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad attaches special importance to this community? Apart from his business partnership with the Lord’s son “Al-Nour Al-Mudi’” and engineer Fuad Takla, a large number of the community members joined the Defense Brigades in compliance with the instructions of their spiritual leaders. They make up the backbone of the Defense Brigades, and they rank right after the Alawite community in terms of importance.”
I said to him, “Trust in God. I am supposed to hear good news very soon.”
He said, “They will be in the presidential palace in a few hours, tomorrow.”
Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Ali kept his promise. President Assad received in his office the Lord’s sons, on top of whom was son “Al-Nour Al-Mudi’”. The meeting lasted over three hours and the information leaked out was as follows:
The children of the Lord Sleiman Al-Murshid said to the president, “We cannot consolidate treachery as a community principle. In the past the British accused us of being French agents (*), and today the nationalists in Syria accuse us of being the US agents. In sum, we are Hafez Al-Assad’s men, and we like your brother Rifaat as we have a feeling that he is your right hand. However, since he renounced allegiance to you, he is not our custodian and we are ready, as of this moment, to assume the task of guarding your office or home.”
The president replied saying, “There is no need for all this. What matters is that you make your fellows in the community aware of this course of action right now.”
The three brothers left the president’s office and called all their community fellows in a quasi-magical way. They all observed the new course of action. Rather than being the impenetrable citadel of secrets, the Defense Brigades became like the sieve sifting out everything that takes place in it. Rifaat learned about the incident and summoned to his office the eldest, Al-Nour Al-Moudi’, and kept talking to him for almost seven hours without getting direct feedback from him.
Finally, Rifaat said to him after he got bored of discussions and bickering, “Do you know that your death costs me only one bullet in your head?”
Al-Nour Al-Moudi’ replied, “I know, but do you know that the second shot will be in your head? For your information, the doorkeeper who offered us coffee and tea now belongs to my clan. In a word, this means that he is a “Murshidi, not a Alawite.”
Rifaat ended the discussion in the hope of meeting another time to carry on. But he looked like a dead man. He asked the political indoctrination officer in the Defense Brigades to conduct a random poll among a hundred soldiers by asking them a single question: “Do you support me or my brother President Hafez Al-Assad?”
The following day, Rifaat Al-Assad was shocked when he learnt that President Assad’s supporters reached 100 per cent, not 99 per cent. Rifaat and his followers became furiously angry and he decided to take his revenge on the Mushidi community. He ordered his men to look for them everywhere and in every military formation, and to gather them near the Burkush Fortress, northwest of Katna city. They were disarmed, forced to go in big military vehicles, and thrown on the Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian border right in front of the Israeli army. Israel did not react to this measure since the soldiers were almost naked and it was dark.
I immediately informed President Assad and sent to each one of them a rifle, a fire unit, a seaman bag, and an operational assignment for three days. I asked General Jamil Hassan, the head of the organization and administrative department to distribute them to all the army units which included 3,225 officers and soldiers stationed from Kameshli to Salkhad.
In three days the consequences of this problem were settled, but Brigadier-General Rifaat had been deeply wounded. It is true that the balance of power was not in his favor at the beginning because the Defense Brigades included around 40,000 soldiers at the peak of the crisis (**), whereas the rest of the army units included almost 360,000 soldiers, but the desertion of the Murshidi community followers undermined its existence and shook its structure. On the basis of this position, Brigadier-General Rifaat decided to discipline Sleiman Al-Murshid’s children in their own home, Jubat Al-Berghal. To this end, he mobilized a commando brigade and sent it in seven vehicles to Lattakia. When I learnt about it, I called the head of the military intelligence in Lattakia Colonel Oussama Said and informed him.
I said, “You have to ensure the security of Al-Nour Al-Moudi’ by quickly mobilizing your detachments or those of the military police, and if need be, you can ask the Navy commander for the required number of soldiers.
He said, “Sir, we don’t need any assistance because around 500 armed men from the Murshidi community are already in Joubat Al-Berghal around Sleiman Murshid’s palace.
Once again, the facts prove that the method of communication used by this community is more advanced than that of any intelligence services in the world, even after their use of satellite communication channels.
When the vanguard of the Defense Brigades arrived in Joubat Al-Berghal, they found out that Sleiman Al-Murshid was heavily guarded and the battle would not be in their favor at all. After they called Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad, he asked them to go down to the coast and be stationed in Tallet Al-Sanawbar camp, which was almost seven kilometers south of Lattakia. Our new allies did not need any financial or military support. Now that the Murshidi community was back under President Assad’s wing, the Defense Brigades began to erode from within and they lost the prestige they had enjoyed in the past. (***)
(*) During the mandate period, France gave special attention to the minorities, and established close ties with them with the aim of shattering national unity. Accordingly, it suggested to the leader of the Murshidi community Sleiman Murshid to claim divinity, to which he responded. When the French left in the aftermath of a long and bitter struggle that lasted 25 years, Sleiman Murshid maintained his erroneous conduct, which made the then Interior Minister Sabri Al-Assali try him as an insurgent and a pretender to divinity at the same time. He was sentenced to death and the sentence was carried out in summer 1947.
(**) According to Al-Wahda daily, issue 15/2/1984, the real number of the Defense Brigades soldiers was 40,094.
(***) Less than a year following this incident, fellow Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Ali was remunerated for his stance. Under the secretary general’s instructions, he was elected member of the Baath Party central committee during the congress held in early 1985.
Our fellow the commander of the Popular Army used to walk around extensively and look for new pieces of news after the March 8 Revolution. He still keeps this habit although over 14 years have elapsed since the Corrective Movement. He would drop by my office once a week and ask me about the situation. I would reassure him that it was ok. For the sake of historical accuracy, I would say that the Headquarters officers did not esteem fellow Abou Nada. President Assad and I were the only persons in the Headquarters who were aware of Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Ali’s struggle and sacrifices for the sake of the party and the revolution, starting with the Free Officers Movement in Aleppo up to the February 23rd Movement. This situation was very painful for fellow Mohammad who, as a result, would visit them once in a while.
After the momentous incident, I closed my office in the face of the Popular Army commander. Although he asked to see me several times, I always apologized. But as he insisted, I finally agreed. When he came, he astonishingly inquired about my position on him.
I said to him, “There are no half solutions when it comes to such issues. You either side with President Assad, or you are on the other front.”
He said, “I support President Hafez Al-Assad, and in order to dispel doubt with certainty, I am ready to bring the sons of Lord Sleiman Murshid from Homs and Joubat Al-Berghal to see Mr. President.”
I said to him, “What is the relevance of the Murshidi community in the crisis?”
He said to me, “Don’t you know that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad attaches special importance to this community? Apart from his business partnership with the Lord’s son “Al-Nour Al-Mudi’” and engineer Fuad Takla, a large number of the community members joined the Defense Brigades in compliance with the instructions of their spiritual leaders. They make up the backbone of the Defense Brigades, and they rank right after the Alawite community in terms of importance.”
I said to him, “Trust in God. I am supposed to hear good news very soon.”
He said, “They will be in the presidential palace in a few hours, tomorrow.”
Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Ali kept his promise. President Assad received in his office the Lord’s sons, on top of whom was son “Al-Nour Al-Mudi’”. The meeting lasted over three hours and the information leaked out was as follows:
The children of the Lord Sleiman Al-Murshid said to the president, “We cannot consolidate treachery as a community principle. In the past the British accused us of being French agents (*), and today the nationalists in Syria accuse us of being the US agents. In sum, we are Hafez Al-Assad’s men, and we like your brother Rifaat as we have a feeling that he is your right hand. However, since he renounced allegiance to you, he is not our custodian and we are ready, as of this moment, to assume the task of guarding your office or home.”
The president replied saying, “There is no need for all this. What matters is that you make your fellows in the community aware of this course of action right now.”
The three brothers left the president’s office and called all their community fellows in a quasi-magical way. They all observed the new course of action. Rather than being the impenetrable citadel of secrets, the Defense Brigades became like the sieve sifting out everything that takes place in it. Rifaat learned about the incident and summoned to his office the eldest, Al-Nour Al-Moudi’, and kept talking to him for almost seven hours without getting direct feedback from him.
Finally, Rifaat said to him after he got bored of discussions and bickering, “Do you know that your death costs me only one bullet in your head?”
Al-Nour Al-Moudi’ replied, “I know, but do you know that the second shot will be in your head? For your information, the doorkeeper who offered us coffee and tea now belongs to my clan. In a word, this means that he is a “Murshidi, not a Alawite.”
Rifaat ended the discussion in the hope of meeting another time to carry on. But he looked like a dead man. He asked the political indoctrination officer in the Defense Brigades to conduct a random poll among a hundred soldiers by asking them a single question: “Do you support me or my brother President Hafez Al-Assad?”
The following day, Rifaat Al-Assad was shocked when he learnt that President Assad’s supporters reached 100 per cent, not 99 per cent. Rifaat and his followers became furiously angry and he decided to take his revenge on the Mushidi community. He ordered his men to look for them everywhere and in every military formation, and to gather them near the Burkush Fortress, northwest of Katna city. They were disarmed, forced to go in big military vehicles, and thrown on the Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian border right in front of the Israeli army. Israel did not react to this measure since the soldiers were almost naked and it was dark.
I immediately informed President Assad and sent to each one of them a rifle, a fire unit, a seaman bag, and an operational assignment for three days. I asked General Jamil Hassan, the head of the organization and administrative department to distribute them to all the army units which included 3,225 officers and soldiers stationed from Kameshli to Salkhad.
In three days the consequences of this problem were settled, but Brigadier-General Rifaat had been deeply wounded. It is true that the balance of power was not in his favor at the beginning because the Defense Brigades included around 40,000 soldiers at the peak of the crisis (**), whereas the rest of the army units included almost 360,000 soldiers, but the desertion of the Murshidi community followers undermined its existence and shook its structure. On the basis of this position, Brigadier-General Rifaat decided to discipline Sleiman Al-Murshid’s children in their own home, Jubat Al-Berghal. To this end, he mobilized a commando brigade and sent it in seven vehicles to Lattakia. When I learnt about it, I called the head of the military intelligence in Lattakia Colonel Oussama Said and informed him.
I said, “You have to ensure the security of Al-Nour Al-Moudi’ by quickly mobilizing your detachments or those of the military police, and if need be, you can ask the Navy commander for the required number of soldiers.
He said, “Sir, we don’t need any assistance because around 500 armed men from the Murshidi community are already in Joubat Al-Berghal around Sleiman Murshid’s palace.
Once again, the facts prove that the method of communication used by this community is more advanced than that of any intelligence services in the world, even after their use of satellite communication channels.
When the vanguard of the Defense Brigades arrived in Joubat Al-Berghal, they found out that Sleiman Al-Murshid was heavily guarded and the battle would not be in their favor at all. After they called Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad, he asked them to go down to the coast and be stationed in Tallet Al-Sanawbar camp, which was almost seven kilometers south of Lattakia. Our new allies did not need any financial or military support. Now that the Murshidi community was back under President Assad’s wing, the Defense Brigades began to erode from within and they lost the prestige they had enjoyed in the past. (***)
(*) During the mandate period, France gave special attention to the minorities, and established close ties with them with the aim of shattering national unity. Accordingly, it suggested to the leader of the Murshidi community Sleiman Murshid to claim divinity, to which he responded. When the French left in the aftermath of a long and bitter struggle that lasted 25 years, Sleiman Murshid maintained his erroneous conduct, which made the then Interior Minister Sabri Al-Assali try him as an insurgent and a pretender to divinity at the same time. He was sentenced to death and the sentence was carried out in summer 1947.
(**) According to Al-Wahda daily, issue 15/2/1984, the real number of the Defense Brigades soldiers was 40,094.
(***) Less than a year following this incident, fellow Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Ali was remunerated for his stance. Under the secretary general’s instructions, he was elected member of the Baath Party central committee during the congress held in early 1985.
- Tlas fomented sectarianism at a time Syria paid an exorbitant price to end sectarian strife and its promoters.
Dear readers, did you carefully read the tale of fellow Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Ali, nicknamed Abou Nada?
General Tlas introduced him to us in the following manner: “The man has a history of struggle. He made sacrifices for the party and the revolution, and he moved from the Free Officers Movement in Aleppo to the February 23 Movement.”
And he described his acts as follows: “He is a man who deals with Brigadier-General Rifaat, like many liars do, including the members of the Higher Studies League.”
Have you ever seen such insanity? How can a person be a struggler and a hypocrite at the same time?
In general, and concerning hypocrites, this applies to you Tlas. The best evidence to the creeping of hypocrisy to the leadership of Syria is your presence among them. We will refer to this point later on.
- Tlas fabricated the Murshidi community tale as something happening by sheer coincidence, and asserted that Abou Nada was the one who raised the issue of the community. But Abou Nada’s summoning of Sleiman’s sons to meet the president in a few hours, and their reception by the president proves that the entire story was not accidental.
Al-Nour Al-Moudi’ literally said to the president, “We hope we are not party to the current conflict, and we beg you to amicably put an end to disagreements.”
What is funny about the story, certainly in case it is true, is that Tlas sent rifles and fire units to the soldiers facing the Israeli forces although he said that Israel did not attack them because they were unarmed. Did he send them weapons so that Israel would attack them?
But, the sad thing about the story is that Tlass spread the young Murshidi men on the border up to Al-Kamishli! This simply means that he ruined the life of 3,000 soldiers and made their families homeless along with them. Thus, dear readers, the new allies were rewarded the Tlas way.
- Tlas says that the man who offered tea and coffee to Sleiman’s sons in Brigadier-General Rifaat’s office was a Murshidi. This is one out of many other pieces of evidence indicating that Rifaat does not deal with his soldiers according to their communal identity. On the contrary, they have always been his sons, whether they are Murshidis, Sunnis, Alawites, Shiites, Christians, Druzes, or of any other faith. I remember that Rifaat said in one of the speeches he delivered before Brigade 40, that he would severely punish anyone in Unit 569 who dares to speak a word with a sectarian connotation.
(*) Unlike Tlass’ claim, Mr. Sleiman Murshid was not a puppet in the hands of the French Mandate. He was rather a military leader known for his struggle against colonialism.
(**) The real number of the Defense Brigades soldiers was 55,000 but we do not blame General Tlass for his lack of information.
(***) Certainly, everything has a price. Here is the virtuous struggler and hypocrite, as Tlas describes him, who joins the non-hypocrites ranks and charges a price for his new position. Notice that he was elected under the instructions of the secretary general! What kind of election is it?
Dear readers, did you carefully read the tale of fellow Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Ali, nicknamed Abou Nada?
General Tlas introduced him to us in the following manner: “The man has a history of struggle. He made sacrifices for the party and the revolution, and he moved from the Free Officers Movement in Aleppo to the February 23 Movement.”
And he described his acts as follows: “He is a man who deals with Brigadier-General Rifaat, like many liars do, including the members of the Higher Studies League.”
Have you ever seen such insanity? How can a person be a struggler and a hypocrite at the same time?
In general, and concerning hypocrites, this applies to you Tlas. The best evidence to the creeping of hypocrisy to the leadership of Syria is your presence among them. We will refer to this point later on.
- Tlas fabricated the Murshidi community tale as something happening by sheer coincidence, and asserted that Abou Nada was the one who raised the issue of the community. But Abou Nada’s summoning of Sleiman’s sons to meet the president in a few hours, and their reception by the president proves that the entire story was not accidental.
Al-Nour Al-Moudi’ literally said to the president, “We hope we are not party to the current conflict, and we beg you to amicably put an end to disagreements.”
What is funny about the story, certainly in case it is true, is that Tlas sent rifles and fire units to the soldiers facing the Israeli forces although he said that Israel did not attack them because they were unarmed. Did he send them weapons so that Israel would attack them?
But, the sad thing about the story is that Tlass spread the young Murshidi men on the border up to Al-Kamishli! This simply means that he ruined the life of 3,000 soldiers and made their families homeless along with them. Thus, dear readers, the new allies were rewarded the Tlas way.
- Tlas says that the man who offered tea and coffee to Sleiman’s sons in Brigadier-General Rifaat’s office was a Murshidi. This is one out of many other pieces of evidence indicating that Rifaat does not deal with his soldiers according to their communal identity. On the contrary, they have always been his sons, whether they are Murshidis, Sunnis, Alawites, Shiites, Christians, Druzes, or of any other faith. I remember that Rifaat said in one of the speeches he delivered before Brigade 40, that he would severely punish anyone in Unit 569 who dares to speak a word with a sectarian connotation.
(*) Unlike Tlass’ claim, Mr. Sleiman Murshid was not a puppet in the hands of the French Mandate. He was rather a military leader known for his struggle against colonialism.
(**) The real number of the Defense Brigades soldiers was 55,000 but we do not blame General Tlass for his lack of information.
(***) Certainly, everything has a price. Here is the virtuous struggler and hypocrite, as Tlas describes him, who joins the non-hypocrites ranks and charges a price for his new position. Notice that he was elected under the instructions of the secretary general! What kind of election is it?
An attempt to open a second front in Lattakia
The Defenses Brigades had a training center for the mountain brigade in the Joubat Al-Berghal area. In addition, Brigadier-General Rifaat occupied Tallat Al-Sanawbar that overlooked the sea. At the same time, a brigade or more of the airdrop regiment were stationed in this area. When the measures taken by Brigadier-General Rifaat against the Murshidi community failed, he ordered his men who were sent from Damascus for this purpose, to be stationed at the said spot to reinforce it and to assume control of an extremely important place near the province center, namely the city of Lattakia.
As Brigadier-General Rifaat used to rely mainly on the Alawite community, he decided to shift the struggle there as this is a sensitive area. He thought that it was hard for the president to order the air force, the artillery, and the missile system to shell the areas of conflict. It was on the basis of this false sense that Rifaat’s steps began to falter, because what is built on falsehood is false.
Rifaat nurtured the dreams of religious fanatics by promising them that he would establish a Alawite state there, like the Jews established the Jewish state in Palestine, and like the extremist Maronites dreamed of establishing sectarian cantons that will live as Israeli satellites. Rifaat was encouraged by the fact that the United States would welcome the idea out of its support to the dismemberment of the Arab nation, as this would serve its national interests and those of its strategic ally, Israel. Brigadier-General Rifaat forgot that his late father, may God’s mercy be upon him, was an extremely fierce opponent of the establishment of the Alawite state. In the mid-1930s, he was at the forefront of the national struggle against this idea and backed its eradication.
Brigadier-General Rifaat began to provoke the regime by ordering his supporters in Lattakia to write on the walls expressions exalting his person to the exclusion of others. One such expression was: “Rifaat Al-Assad is like the sun that never goes down.” They also began to set up surprise checkpoints to let citizens realize their strong presence in the two coastal provinces of Lattakia and Tartous. I called President Assad and communicated to him the available information about Brigadier-General Rifaat’s intention and that he attempted to control the president’s hometown to convey the following message to the world: “If my brother is unable to control the province where he was born, he is unable to control the rest of the provinces.”
As Brigadier-General Rifaat used to rely mainly on the Alawite community, he decided to shift the struggle there as this is a sensitive area. He thought that it was hard for the president to order the air force, the artillery, and the missile system to shell the areas of conflict. It was on the basis of this false sense that Rifaat’s steps began to falter, because what is built on falsehood is false.
Rifaat nurtured the dreams of religious fanatics by promising them that he would establish a Alawite state there, like the Jews established the Jewish state in Palestine, and like the extremist Maronites dreamed of establishing sectarian cantons that will live as Israeli satellites. Rifaat was encouraged by the fact that the United States would welcome the idea out of its support to the dismemberment of the Arab nation, as this would serve its national interests and those of its strategic ally, Israel. Brigadier-General Rifaat forgot that his late father, may God’s mercy be upon him, was an extremely fierce opponent of the establishment of the Alawite state. In the mid-1930s, he was at the forefront of the national struggle against this idea and backed its eradication.
Brigadier-General Rifaat began to provoke the regime by ordering his supporters in Lattakia to write on the walls expressions exalting his person to the exclusion of others. One such expression was: “Rifaat Al-Assad is like the sun that never goes down.” They also began to set up surprise checkpoints to let citizens realize their strong presence in the two coastal provinces of Lattakia and Tartous. I called President Assad and communicated to him the available information about Brigadier-General Rifaat’s intention and that he attempted to control the president’s hometown to convey the following message to the world: “If my brother is unable to control the province where he was born, he is unable to control the rest of the provinces.”
- You are indeed a hypocrite, Mustafa Tlass.
Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad had an army that you could not resist, as you admitted. Then, why does he need to nurture the fanatics’ dreams?
Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad had an army that you could not resist, as you admitted. Then, why does he need to nurture the fanatics’ dreams?
President Al-Assad’s instructions were crystal clear, “No peace at all with the dissidents. Hit them today before tomorrow, because the later we hit them and settle accounts with them, the more they commit excesses and harm citizens, and the more they give a false impression about the situation in Syria to the Arabs and to the rest of the world.”
I called the Navy Commander Major General Fadl Hussein and said to him, “You have to send an ultimatum to the rebels in the Defense Brigades camp demanding their surrender in an hour’s time. After that, if they do not comply with it, you have to shell them with the coast artillery and move the Naval Infantry Brigade toward them, supported by the 826 Tank Regiment.” I also asked him to dispatch two minesweepers and six missile boats, hit the rebels with antiaircraft artillery (direct shooting), and make these forces get close to the coast to hit them with long range shells (antisubmarine) and with heavy antiaircraft machine guns mounted on missile boats.
When I noticed signs of hesitation, villainy, and indecisiveness, I assured him that I gave orders on behalf of the General Commander, and that if he was unable to carry out the task, we were ready to dispatch an airdrop commando regiment to liquidate the rebels. I told him that the ultimatum would come to an end in an hour, after which he had to start shelling the camp.
An hour later, I called the Navy Commander and asked him, “Did you start shooting?”
He replied saying, “We fired a volley at them and now we are doing the casualty count.”
His tone of voice assured me that he was lying (25) and prevaricating, and that he was frightened and unserious about handling the issue. When I asked him about Lieutenant Colonel Ali Khdour, the Commander of the Tank Regiment, he said, “He is next to me.”
I talked to Khdour and said to him, “You have to personally climb into the first tank in the regiment and ask the riflemen to point their canons at the armored (BMB) vehicles stationed at the camp entrance by the rebels. Destroy them completely and burn them with the fire of a tank brigade. I mean that ten tanks should be firing simultaneously.”
My major objective was to cause a moral shock to the adversaries. A few minutes later, the order was executed and three troop carriers were destroyed while the casualties were evacuated. Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad turned to President Assad for help and begged him for a ceasefire because he decided to evacuate the camp and carry out the Supreme Command instructions.
Thus, the problem was settled in the coastal area, the camp was recaptured, and the soldiers of the Defense Brigades went back to Damascus.
It is necessary to inform the readers about the atmosphere prevailing in one of the discussions that took place at the Headquarters right after the clashes.
General Hikmat Al-Shihabi made the following statement with which General Ali Aslan agreed, “After over 500 cars returned to Homs and Tripoli, the problem has been laid bare to all people, and we can no longer cover it up.”
I replied saying, “Not a single news agency will report this piece of news for two reasons. First, Western news and US-backed agencies will not release the news as it highlights President Assad’s victory, an undesirable thing for them. Second, news agencies operating in the Soviet orbit will not release the news either so as not cause us embarrassment after we, ourselves, did not release it.”
My expectations came true as no Western news agency or press, including pro-US Lebanese newspapers, released the piece of news.
I called the Navy Commander Major General Fadl Hussein and said to him, “You have to send an ultimatum to the rebels in the Defense Brigades camp demanding their surrender in an hour’s time. After that, if they do not comply with it, you have to shell them with the coast artillery and move the Naval Infantry Brigade toward them, supported by the 826 Tank Regiment.” I also asked him to dispatch two minesweepers and six missile boats, hit the rebels with antiaircraft artillery (direct shooting), and make these forces get close to the coast to hit them with long range shells (antisubmarine) and with heavy antiaircraft machine guns mounted on missile boats.
When I noticed signs of hesitation, villainy, and indecisiveness, I assured him that I gave orders on behalf of the General Commander, and that if he was unable to carry out the task, we were ready to dispatch an airdrop commando regiment to liquidate the rebels. I told him that the ultimatum would come to an end in an hour, after which he had to start shelling the camp.
An hour later, I called the Navy Commander and asked him, “Did you start shooting?”
He replied saying, “We fired a volley at them and now we are doing the casualty count.”
His tone of voice assured me that he was lying (25) and prevaricating, and that he was frightened and unserious about handling the issue. When I asked him about Lieutenant Colonel Ali Khdour, the Commander of the Tank Regiment, he said, “He is next to me.”
I talked to Khdour and said to him, “You have to personally climb into the first tank in the regiment and ask the riflemen to point their canons at the armored (BMB) vehicles stationed at the camp entrance by the rebels. Destroy them completely and burn them with the fire of a tank brigade. I mean that ten tanks should be firing simultaneously.”
My major objective was to cause a moral shock to the adversaries. A few minutes later, the order was executed and three troop carriers were destroyed while the casualties were evacuated. Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad turned to President Assad for help and begged him for a ceasefire because he decided to evacuate the camp and carry out the Supreme Command instructions.
Thus, the problem was settled in the coastal area, the camp was recaptured, and the soldiers of the Defense Brigades went back to Damascus.
It is necessary to inform the readers about the atmosphere prevailing in one of the discussions that took place at the Headquarters right after the clashes.
General Hikmat Al-Shihabi made the following statement with which General Ali Aslan agreed, “After over 500 cars returned to Homs and Tripoli, the problem has been laid bare to all people, and we can no longer cover it up.”
I replied saying, “Not a single news agency will report this piece of news for two reasons. First, Western news and US-backed agencies will not release the news as it highlights President Assad’s victory, an undesirable thing for them. Second, news agencies operating in the Soviet orbit will not release the news either so as not cause us embarrassment after we, ourselves, did not release it.”
My expectations came true as no Western news agency or press, including pro-US Lebanese newspapers, released the piece of news.
- We can write a great deal about this incident, although it is unlikely that it is devoid of lies. In an anticipation of the readers’ inquiries about the reasons behind not hearing the news at the time, General Hikmat Al-Shihabi and General Ali Aslan fabricated the story. He weaved the tale about news agencies and expected they would not release the news.
- In brief, the minister of defense issued the order to shell, while the Navy Commander disobeyed it, and Lieutenant Ali Khdour executed it.
Note how the Navy Commander acted wisely, while the minister of defense insisted on shedding innocent blood.
To put it in a nutshell, Major General Tlass admitted committing a massacre to which Syrian soldiers were victims!
Let us assume that one of the Defense Brigades units was stationed at the wrong spot, should the army shell it?
- Did you read Tlass’ orders carefully? I will repeat them.
“... you have to shell them with the coast artillery and move the Naval Infantry Brigade toward them, supported by the 826 Tank Regiment.” I also asked him to dispatch two minesweepers and six missile boats, hit the rebels with antiaircraft artillery (direct shooting), and make these forces get close to the coast to hit them with long range shells (antisubmarine) and with heavy antiaircraft machine guns mounted on missile boats.”
- Mr. General, how did you become an officer in the army? Did you really graduate from the Military Academy?
- Our minister of defense, I will consider your reference to the minesweepers a slip of the tongue. Maybe you are a little confused, and as a result you thought you attacked fulcrums reinforced by mine fields. But can you explain to us the benefits of using anti-submarines during the fight with land forces? And how do you use them?
If you had such heavy fire, why didn’t you fire at the Israeli aircraft that entered the airspace through the coast and hit targets in Syrian territories?
The soldiers are certainly aware that this order, as Tlass referred to it, cannot be issued by an officer having the minimum of military knowledge.
Finally, we can only say that we are really plagued by a minister of defense with poor distinguishing abilities.
- In brief, the minister of defense issued the order to shell, while the Navy Commander disobeyed it, and Lieutenant Ali Khdour executed it.
Note how the Navy Commander acted wisely, while the minister of defense insisted on shedding innocent blood.
To put it in a nutshell, Major General Tlass admitted committing a massacre to which Syrian soldiers were victims!
Let us assume that one of the Defense Brigades units was stationed at the wrong spot, should the army shell it?
- Did you read Tlass’ orders carefully? I will repeat them.
“... you have to shell them with the coast artillery and move the Naval Infantry Brigade toward them, supported by the 826 Tank Regiment.” I also asked him to dispatch two minesweepers and six missile boats, hit the rebels with antiaircraft artillery (direct shooting), and make these forces get close to the coast to hit them with long range shells (antisubmarine) and with heavy antiaircraft machine guns mounted on missile boats.”
- Mr. General, how did you become an officer in the army? Did you really graduate from the Military Academy?
- Our minister of defense, I will consider your reference to the minesweepers a slip of the tongue. Maybe you are a little confused, and as a result you thought you attacked fulcrums reinforced by mine fields. But can you explain to us the benefits of using anti-submarines during the fight with land forces? And how do you use them?
If you had such heavy fire, why didn’t you fire at the Israeli aircraft that entered the airspace through the coast and hit targets in Syrian territories?
The soldiers are certainly aware that this order, as Tlass referred to it, cannot be issued by an officer having the minimum of military knowledge.
Finally, we can only say that we are really plagued by a minister of defense with poor distinguishing abilities.