For months thereafter not a word about Rifaat appeared in the Syrian press, although the campaign continued to root out what remained of his influence. His once proud Defence Companies were reduced to a division-sized force of about 20,000-strong: large numbers of men were demobilized or switched to other units such as Adnan Makhluf’s Presidential Guard and Ali Haydar’s Special Forces. Several of Rifaat’s key officers were placed under arrest and a number were said to have been shot. Some civilian loyalists were forcibly evicted from the Fursan housing estate. Nothing was more wounding to a liege lord of Rifaat’s caliber than to be unable to protect his own. Baath party members were instructed to quit the League of Higher Graduates, which withered in the absence of its exuberant patron. Rifaat owned property all over Damascus which in his heyday, and to the inconvenience of the local residents, were sealed off by roadblocks. These were now removed without fanfare, and people were able to enjoy walking up and down streets which had once been forbidden to them.
On 1 August 1984, in another turn of the screw, a handful of prominent party leaders close to Rifaat had their membership of the Regional Command ‘frozen’. This was the fate of Mohammad Haydar, a former deputy premier for economic affairs who acquired vast wealth, built himself a palatial home in Zabadani, a mountain resort near Damascus, and married off one of his daughters to one of Rifaat’s sons. Another who fell from grace was the unlucky General Naji Jamil, who ironically had lost his job as air force chief in March 1978 for opposing Rifaat but who now suffered again for having made it up with him. In Latakia some of the properties of the once dominant Jamil al-Asad were confiscated. University places that September were won with bona fide marks alone, and some of Rifaat’s young parachutists, deprived of their bonuses, had to spend an extra year at school.
Elliptical references to the brothers’ war appeared in print and were much talked about. For example, a veteran Baathist and former academic, Hafiz al-Jamali wrote a fable in the party newspaper. At a moment of crisis the citizens of an imaginary city are ordered to extinguish all lights. An old woman lights a candle. She is arrested and sentenced to death. Yet at the moment of execution she prays God to grant long life to the ruler. ‘If he dies’, she explains, ‘someone worse may come.’ Asad, the fable seemed to say, was preferable to his brother. Another pointer to the sotto voce debate was a play by the well-known ‘Alawi dramatist Sa‘adallah Wannus about a power struggle between a king and his vizier. Entitled ‘The Adventure of Slave Jabir’s Head (Mughamarat ra’s al-mamluk Jabir), it was performed even before the crisis was over.
The ambiguity which surrounded Asad’s relations with his brother was officially dispelled on 11 September 1984 when the German news magazine Der Spiegel published an interview with General Tlas, Asad’s Defence Minister, in which he declared Rifaat to be ‘permanently persona non grata’. The quarrel was at last out in the open.
On 1 August 1984, in another turn of the screw, a handful of prominent party leaders close to Rifaat had their membership of the Regional Command ‘frozen’. This was the fate of Mohammad Haydar, a former deputy premier for economic affairs who acquired vast wealth, built himself a palatial home in Zabadani, a mountain resort near Damascus, and married off one of his daughters to one of Rifaat’s sons. Another who fell from grace was the unlucky General Naji Jamil, who ironically had lost his job as air force chief in March 1978 for opposing Rifaat but who now suffered again for having made it up with him. In Latakia some of the properties of the once dominant Jamil al-Asad were confiscated. University places that September were won with bona fide marks alone, and some of Rifaat’s young parachutists, deprived of their bonuses, had to spend an extra year at school.
Elliptical references to the brothers’ war appeared in print and were much talked about. For example, a veteran Baathist and former academic, Hafiz al-Jamali wrote a fable in the party newspaper. At a moment of crisis the citizens of an imaginary city are ordered to extinguish all lights. An old woman lights a candle. She is arrested and sentenced to death. Yet at the moment of execution she prays God to grant long life to the ruler. ‘If he dies’, she explains, ‘someone worse may come.’ Asad, the fable seemed to say, was preferable to his brother. Another pointer to the sotto voce debate was a play by the well-known ‘Alawi dramatist Sa‘adallah Wannus about a power struggle between a king and his vizier. Entitled ‘The Adventure of Slave Jabir’s Head (Mughamarat ra’s al-mamluk Jabir), it was performed even before the crisis was over.
The ambiguity which surrounded Asad’s relations with his brother was officially dispelled on 11 September 1984 when the German news magazine Der Spiegel published an interview with General Tlas, Asad’s Defence Minister, in which he declared Rifaat to be ‘permanently persona non grata’. The quarrel was at last out in the open.
Patrick Seale said that President Assad pledged to protect Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad’s assets, and that the Defense Brigades were one of his most important assets. Yet, despite Syria’s compelling need for the Defense Brigades and their striking military power, the president broke his pledge and destroyed them. What were the reasons?
There were simply two reasons behind it.
First, it has to do with the human psyche. After President Assad found himself unable to face the Defense Brigades, and after he personally witnessed its troops’ strong allegiance to Brigadier-General Assad, he could no longer coexist with the brigades commanders and not even hear of the brigades name. He was even reluctant to accept the idea of the brigades presence in the army.
Second, there was a contradiction between the personality traits of the Defense Brigades commanders known for the manliness, courage, and openness that the brigadier-general had inculcated in them, and the personality traits of officers and leaders surrounding President Assad, who were used to carrying out orders without any discussion.
President Assad did not harbor grudges against the Defense Brigades alone, but that crisis aroused bitter feelings in him toward other army units as he found out that most of their commanders supported the brigadier-general.
Hundreds of army officers and commanders loyal to the Defense Brigades and their commander were dismissed by the president and had their power limited. He also evicted hundreds of army officers from the houses that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad had offered them. As for the Defense Brigades, as soon as the brigadier-general left Syria, the president personally oversaw the process of their dismantling and the destruction of their military power and ideological foundations. Thus, he ordered the arrest of a number of officers and the stripping of their military ranks. In addition, he dismissed and transferred tens of officers and thousands of soldiers to other units. In weeks the Defense Brigades had been reduced from 55,000 to 25,000 fighters. The president had to keep this number due to the problems and disturbances resulting from the arbitrary dismissal of such an enormous number of officers and soldiers.
But the greatest destruction brought about by President Hafez Al-Assad targeted the ideological foundations of the Defense Brigades that helped their members achieve high levels of awareness with respect to national struggle and faith. Here is the commander of the Defense Brigades asserting this truth.
There were simply two reasons behind it.
First, it has to do with the human psyche. After President Assad found himself unable to face the Defense Brigades, and after he personally witnessed its troops’ strong allegiance to Brigadier-General Assad, he could no longer coexist with the brigades commanders and not even hear of the brigades name. He was even reluctant to accept the idea of the brigades presence in the army.
Second, there was a contradiction between the personality traits of the Defense Brigades commanders known for the manliness, courage, and openness that the brigadier-general had inculcated in them, and the personality traits of officers and leaders surrounding President Assad, who were used to carrying out orders without any discussion.
President Assad did not harbor grudges against the Defense Brigades alone, but that crisis aroused bitter feelings in him toward other army units as he found out that most of their commanders supported the brigadier-general.
Hundreds of army officers and commanders loyal to the Defense Brigades and their commander were dismissed by the president and had their power limited. He also evicted hundreds of army officers from the houses that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad had offered them. As for the Defense Brigades, as soon as the brigadier-general left Syria, the president personally oversaw the process of their dismantling and the destruction of their military power and ideological foundations. Thus, he ordered the arrest of a number of officers and the stripping of their military ranks. In addition, he dismissed and transferred tens of officers and thousands of soldiers to other units. In weeks the Defense Brigades had been reduced from 55,000 to 25,000 fighters. The president had to keep this number due to the problems and disturbances resulting from the arbitrary dismissal of such an enormous number of officers and soldiers.
But the greatest destruction brought about by President Hafez Al-Assad targeted the ideological foundations of the Defense Brigades that helped their members achieve high levels of awareness with respect to national struggle and faith. Here is the commander of the Defense Brigades asserting this truth.
As for the League of Higher Graduates, it was rightly one of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad’s greatest achievements, and as Patrick Seale said, this league included thousands of Syria’s most competent cultured people under a single umbrella where they complemented each other, exchanged their experiences, and worked on finding ways capable of modernizing Syria and let it catch up with technologically advanced states. If Patrick Seale compared the liberal-minded league members with the bureaucratic-minded Baath Party members, we can say that the president’s suspension of the league activities consolidated bureaucracy and eliminated the initiative and the spirit of creativity among Syrian intellectuals.
Even the state institutions were not spared. Tens of directors were dismissed to be replaced with less competent persons, on condition that they expressed allegiance to the president only. In brief, whoever was proven to sympathize with Brigadier-General Assad, even with a word, would be either arrested or dismissed, whether they were civilians or members of the military.
Patrick Seale dwelled on the issue of the party and said that a number of party cadres known for their allegiance to Brigadier-General Assad were dismissed. Although it is known that hundreds of party leaders were dismissed against the background of their allegiance to the brigadier-general, Patrick Seale mentioned former Minister Mohammad Haydar whose fortune he uncovered, and Brigadier Naji Jamil who fell victim of his allegiance twice, according to the author. Who is the liar who provided Patrick Seale with information about Minister Haydar’s fortune? Is each owner of a house in Zabadani considered wealthy? If ever he had a house there. At any rate, we are certain that Mohammad Haydar used to live in one of the Defense Brigades houses in the Mezze neighborhood, Damascus from which he was evicted. In this regard, we would like to whisper in Patrick Seale’s ear the following: we had previously said in a comment on Mustafa Tlas’ writings that we challenge anyone to find a single wealthy officer in the ranks of the Defense Brigades, regardless of his standing with the commander of the Defense Brigades. This applied to the persons who were close to him, whether they were ministers, officers, or others. A number of reasons lie behind the accusation of accumulating wealth, but until we solve this riddle to the readers, we say that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad refused to see people around him not leading a decent life in which their needs were met. He used to generously offer houses and cars owned by the Defense Brigades. He also used to provide financial assistance to officers and soldiers to help them and their families cover their living expenses, in an attempt to prevent any potential involvement in corruption or illegal activities. People used to compare between them and the majority of officers and soldiers belonging to other army units, who had to work as taxi drivers or hawkers, or smugglers to make ends meet for them and their families. This comparison made people think that the Defense Brigades officers, their commander’s close circle or protégés enjoyed enormous wealth.
Regarding Seale’s focus on Minister Mohammad Haydar and General Naji Jamil, a number of reasons stand behind it and deserve to be explained owing to their role in enhancing the readers’ understanding of the 1984 incidents.
We have already stated that Mr. Jamil Al-Assad went to the brigadier-general’s home to inform him that he would face problems with the president due to accusations of plotting to overthrow the regime. We have also said that the brigadier-general replied to the president’s accusations by expressing his willingness to stand trial in case they were evidenced.
Two days later, President Assad met with former Minister Mohammad Haydar and General Naji Jamil, and according to the latter’s report, the president talked to them at length while explaining his point of view. He entrusted them with conveying a message to Brigadier-General Assad to the effect that his interest lay exclusively in supporting the regime’s approach.
When they communicated the message to the brigadier-general, he asked them what they meant by approach and how he could support it. They went back to the president with the question to which he replied by telling them that the brigadier-general understood what he had in mind, and as such he asked them to communicate this message to him. This time they asked him to relieve the president [of uneasiness] and quoted him as saying that his brother knew what he meant.
Consequently, Brigadier-General Assad wrote a letter in which he expressed his support for the approach followed by the Arab Socialist Baath Party regarding unity, liberty, and socialism, as well as the objectives that had prompted them to stage the Corrective Movement. Expressing their belief that this was the president’s request, they returned to his office carrying the brigadier-general’s letter. As soon as the president read it, he threw it away and asked them to tell him that he understood what the president wanted exactly. They went to the brigadier-general’s office with a stunned amazement and reported the president’s words.
Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad laughed and said, “For sure I understand what the president expects. He wants me to lend him unconditional support and to admit that there is no opinion other than his own, and no decision except his own. If any official wants to rob public money, the president does not mind as long as he supports him. As for the decaying state institutions, its failed projects, its sagging economy, its misguided foreign policy, and the slogans we have fought for, to hell with them. This is what the president wants. Go and tell him so.”
They said to the brigadier-general that it was inconceivable that the president asked him to do so. Then, he asked them, in case they were not convinced of what he said, to go to the president and communicate to him what he said to them. When they informed the president that the brigadier-general said he (i.e. the president) expected him to demonstrate unconditional support regardless of the way he ruled the country, and to refrain from objecting to his decisions or discussing them, the president was infuriated and wondered if anything was wrong with this. He asked why there should be any objection to his decision. As he was the president of the country, he considered himself its leader, and ultimate decisions lay with him.
Minister Mohammad Haydar and General Naji Jamil were surprised at they heard such statements from the president and realized that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad was right in objecting to the president’s ruling pattern. And after the president had chosen them as his messengers, he felt indignation for them. They were subject to exceptional harassment including the eviction of Minister Haydar from the house he lived in and which Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad had allotted him in the officers’ housing complex in Mezze. Their enormous suffering made them typical examples that Patrick Seale used in his report on the punishment and torture perpetrated against the brigadier-general’s supporters.
The author also referred to the brigadier-general’s property and said that some of it was a source of nuisance to the residents. The author most probably means the house lying on the Mezze Damascus Highway where a concrete barrier was set up to ensure protection to his home, the UN office, the British ambassador’s home, and neighboring houses from booby trapped cars. Indeed, such a car targeting the brigadier-general exploded, but had it not been for this barrier the casualties would have been heavy. At the same time, we know that the neighborhood residents were highly satisfied with these security measures. After the barrier was removed, a terrorist group exploded a booby trapped car in the same spot in 2004, causing a number of casualties, which led the residents to wonder why the wall protecting them had been removed. But if what is meant is the checkpoint set up before Al-Shaalan office, we know that it was kept for years, even after the brigadier-general left the office. However, despite the inconvenience caused by these barriers, they surely cannot be compared with the ones surrounding the president’s home and office in Al-Muhajireen neighborhood and annoying not just the local residents but also all the residents of Damascus. In fact, the neighborhood residents endure sheer hell for being banned from opening windows, or even looking out them, or receiving visitors, and in case they wish to receive relatives or visitors they have to submit an explanation to the guard detachment which will decide if the visit can be made or not. On the other hand, the residents of Damascus suffer another sort of inconvenience. They are banned from riding motorcycles in the capital, while pick up trucks and four-wheel drive cars cannot cross any of the streets close to the president’s home and office, namely the main and side streets in Al-Muhajireen district and Al-Maliki Square.
Regarding the paratroopers, we assert that all those who took a paratrooper session got their lot of extra grades. As for the author’s statement that some were deprived of them, this discredits the leadership that took such an arbitrary decision affecting young Syrians who are not to blame for the incidents under discussion.
Even the state institutions were not spared. Tens of directors were dismissed to be replaced with less competent persons, on condition that they expressed allegiance to the president only. In brief, whoever was proven to sympathize with Brigadier-General Assad, even with a word, would be either arrested or dismissed, whether they were civilians or members of the military.
Patrick Seale dwelled on the issue of the party and said that a number of party cadres known for their allegiance to Brigadier-General Assad were dismissed. Although it is known that hundreds of party leaders were dismissed against the background of their allegiance to the brigadier-general, Patrick Seale mentioned former Minister Mohammad Haydar whose fortune he uncovered, and Brigadier Naji Jamil who fell victim of his allegiance twice, according to the author. Who is the liar who provided Patrick Seale with information about Minister Haydar’s fortune? Is each owner of a house in Zabadani considered wealthy? If ever he had a house there. At any rate, we are certain that Mohammad Haydar used to live in one of the Defense Brigades houses in the Mezze neighborhood, Damascus from which he was evicted. In this regard, we would like to whisper in Patrick Seale’s ear the following: we had previously said in a comment on Mustafa Tlas’ writings that we challenge anyone to find a single wealthy officer in the ranks of the Defense Brigades, regardless of his standing with the commander of the Defense Brigades. This applied to the persons who were close to him, whether they were ministers, officers, or others. A number of reasons lie behind the accusation of accumulating wealth, but until we solve this riddle to the readers, we say that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad refused to see people around him not leading a decent life in which their needs were met. He used to generously offer houses and cars owned by the Defense Brigades. He also used to provide financial assistance to officers and soldiers to help them and their families cover their living expenses, in an attempt to prevent any potential involvement in corruption or illegal activities. People used to compare between them and the majority of officers and soldiers belonging to other army units, who had to work as taxi drivers or hawkers, or smugglers to make ends meet for them and their families. This comparison made people think that the Defense Brigades officers, their commander’s close circle or protégés enjoyed enormous wealth.
Regarding Seale’s focus on Minister Mohammad Haydar and General Naji Jamil, a number of reasons stand behind it and deserve to be explained owing to their role in enhancing the readers’ understanding of the 1984 incidents.
We have already stated that Mr. Jamil Al-Assad went to the brigadier-general’s home to inform him that he would face problems with the president due to accusations of plotting to overthrow the regime. We have also said that the brigadier-general replied to the president’s accusations by expressing his willingness to stand trial in case they were evidenced.
Two days later, President Assad met with former Minister Mohammad Haydar and General Naji Jamil, and according to the latter’s report, the president talked to them at length while explaining his point of view. He entrusted them with conveying a message to Brigadier-General Assad to the effect that his interest lay exclusively in supporting the regime’s approach.
When they communicated the message to the brigadier-general, he asked them what they meant by approach and how he could support it. They went back to the president with the question to which he replied by telling them that the brigadier-general understood what he had in mind, and as such he asked them to communicate this message to him. This time they asked him to relieve the president [of uneasiness] and quoted him as saying that his brother knew what he meant.
Consequently, Brigadier-General Assad wrote a letter in which he expressed his support for the approach followed by the Arab Socialist Baath Party regarding unity, liberty, and socialism, as well as the objectives that had prompted them to stage the Corrective Movement. Expressing their belief that this was the president’s request, they returned to his office carrying the brigadier-general’s letter. As soon as the president read it, he threw it away and asked them to tell him that he understood what the president wanted exactly. They went to the brigadier-general’s office with a stunned amazement and reported the president’s words.
Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad laughed and said, “For sure I understand what the president expects. He wants me to lend him unconditional support and to admit that there is no opinion other than his own, and no decision except his own. If any official wants to rob public money, the president does not mind as long as he supports him. As for the decaying state institutions, its failed projects, its sagging economy, its misguided foreign policy, and the slogans we have fought for, to hell with them. This is what the president wants. Go and tell him so.”
They said to the brigadier-general that it was inconceivable that the president asked him to do so. Then, he asked them, in case they were not convinced of what he said, to go to the president and communicate to him what he said to them. When they informed the president that the brigadier-general said he (i.e. the president) expected him to demonstrate unconditional support regardless of the way he ruled the country, and to refrain from objecting to his decisions or discussing them, the president was infuriated and wondered if anything was wrong with this. He asked why there should be any objection to his decision. As he was the president of the country, he considered himself its leader, and ultimate decisions lay with him.
Minister Mohammad Haydar and General Naji Jamil were surprised at they heard such statements from the president and realized that Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad was right in objecting to the president’s ruling pattern. And after the president had chosen them as his messengers, he felt indignation for them. They were subject to exceptional harassment including the eviction of Minister Haydar from the house he lived in and which Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad had allotted him in the officers’ housing complex in Mezze. Their enormous suffering made them typical examples that Patrick Seale used in his report on the punishment and torture perpetrated against the brigadier-general’s supporters.
The author also referred to the brigadier-general’s property and said that some of it was a source of nuisance to the residents. The author most probably means the house lying on the Mezze Damascus Highway where a concrete barrier was set up to ensure protection to his home, the UN office, the British ambassador’s home, and neighboring houses from booby trapped cars. Indeed, such a car targeting the brigadier-general exploded, but had it not been for this barrier the casualties would have been heavy. At the same time, we know that the neighborhood residents were highly satisfied with these security measures. After the barrier was removed, a terrorist group exploded a booby trapped car in the same spot in 2004, causing a number of casualties, which led the residents to wonder why the wall protecting them had been removed. But if what is meant is the checkpoint set up before Al-Shaalan office, we know that it was kept for years, even after the brigadier-general left the office. However, despite the inconvenience caused by these barriers, they surely cannot be compared with the ones surrounding the president’s home and office in Al-Muhajireen neighborhood and annoying not just the local residents but also all the residents of Damascus. In fact, the neighborhood residents endure sheer hell for being banned from opening windows, or even looking out them, or receiving visitors, and in case they wish to receive relatives or visitors they have to submit an explanation to the guard detachment which will decide if the visit can be made or not. On the other hand, the residents of Damascus suffer another sort of inconvenience. They are banned from riding motorcycles in the capital, while pick up trucks and four-wheel drive cars cannot cross any of the streets close to the president’s home and office, namely the main and side streets in Al-Muhajireen district and Al-Maliki Square.
Regarding the paratroopers, we assert that all those who took a paratrooper session got their lot of extra grades. As for the author’s statement that some were deprived of them, this discredits the leadership that took such an arbitrary decision affecting young Syrians who are not to blame for the incidents under discussion.
Rifaat’s banishment allowed Syrian society to perform an act of expiation. He left heaped with curses as if he were carrying away not just the sins of his Defence Companies and of his own indulgent lifestyle but also the abuses of the Baath revolution. In the public perception, his misdeeds highlighted Asad’s virtues. Yet there was something paradoxical about a turbulent Third World country banishing its scapegoat to nice neutral Switzerland.
As befitted a grand seigneur, Rifaat was accompanied in Geneva by over a hundred aides and bodyguards, a costly entourage which, it is said, Colonel Qadhafi of Libya helped to finance to keep Rifaat out of Syria. Maintaining a private army in Swiss hotels would strain any purse, even one as deep as Rifaat’s. In any event there were problems with visas which required prolonged negotiations with the Swiss authorities. By September many of Rifaat’s men had drifted home and he himself had moved to France with a reduced suite of guards, servants, wives and children. But Damascus was clearly not happy to have this flamboyant and outspoken personage on the loose. When in July Foreign Minister Khaddam narrowly escaped death from a car bomb, suspicious souls said that this was Rifaat’s work. To Asad’s great anger Rifaat was also reported to have met Yasir ‘Arafat in Geneva. And when it was learned that Rifaat was planning to publish an anti-regime magazine in France and even to start a radio station, Damascus decided it was time to bring him home.
Rifaat still retained the title of vice-president and Asad himself never publicly condemned him, leaving in the public mind a continuing uncertainty about the real nature of their relations. On 10 November 1984 a presidential decree entrusted Rifaat with the supervision of national security - making him in theory the overlord of all his rivals, and on the 26th he returned to Damascus, called at the presidency, and knelt and kissed at his brother’s hand. But he had not been forgiven. His security job was a sham. He was prevented from renewing contact with his slimmed down Defence Companies and he was hemmed in everywhere he turned. It was painful for a man who had once enjoyed unfettered power to find himself so constrained.
The long-drawn-out struggle between the brothers was brought to its formal conclusion at the Eighth Regional Congress of the Baath party held in Damascus from 5 to 20 January 1985, and attended by 780 delegates from across the country. Rifaat, as a member of the Regional Command, was present, but he was also in a sense in the dock and was exposed to a good deal of criticism. Everyone at the Congress knew how narrowly Syria had escaped fratricidal strife, and to whom they owed renewed serenity.
Party rules stipulated that the Congress elect a Central Committee - hitherto of seventy-five members, now expanded to ninety. These men in turn had the task of electing the new Regional Command, the highest pinnacle of party power. But at the Eighth Congress the rule book was laid aside: Asad, master of the external and internal scene, victor of the struggle for Lebanon and of the succession crisis, was by acclamation awarded special powers. In recognition of his unchallenged personal pre-eminence the delegates entrusted him with the task of personally naming the ninety Central Committee members. It was a gesture of confidence in the political wizard who had checked the slide into civil war. Benignly, Asad sat through every session of the Congress, enjoying his apotheosis. Three weeks later, on 10 February 1985, he was elected president of Syria for a third seven-year term by 99,97 per cent of the voters.
Asad had triumphed, but in the crisis the institutions of his state had made a poor showing. At the moment of danger he had to go down into the street himself and clear the ranks away. Checks, balances, the People’s Assembly, the Popular Organizations, indeed the party itself with its extensive structure in both the country and the army, were all of no avail when ambitious generals threatened to shoot it out. In the end it was his personal authority and that alone which held the country together. He was the only pole holding up the tent. It was not a good augury for the future.
Meanwhile Rifaat took off again for Europe, his hope of rehabilitation dashed. Asad’s severity toward his brother did not abate. Although he was attached to Rifaat and owed him a lot, the defence of the political line to which he was committed overrode sentiment or family attachment. He remained convinced that his brother had, wittingly or not, been involved with foreign powers in an attempted coup against him and against his policies, and this he could not let pass.
In May 1986 Rifaat (who by this time had established himself in Paris in the splendour associated with exiled royalty) paid an unannounced visit to Britain. He was preceded by four armed bodyguards carrying Moroccan passports whom the British authorities quietly detained. Then two private planes landed at Heathrow carrying Rifaat, members of his family, retainers and security men, some forty people in all. Many of these too traveled on Moroccan passports. The British government allowed the party in, but a message was sent to the Syrian government through diplomatic channels requesting clarification of the visitors’ status. Asad’s response was swift: ‘We expect Britain to behave correctly towards holders of valid Syrian passports. What Britain does with holders of other passports is no concern of ours.’
As befitted a grand seigneur, Rifaat was accompanied in Geneva by over a hundred aides and bodyguards, a costly entourage which, it is said, Colonel Qadhafi of Libya helped to finance to keep Rifaat out of Syria. Maintaining a private army in Swiss hotels would strain any purse, even one as deep as Rifaat’s. In any event there were problems with visas which required prolonged negotiations with the Swiss authorities. By September many of Rifaat’s men had drifted home and he himself had moved to France with a reduced suite of guards, servants, wives and children. But Damascus was clearly not happy to have this flamboyant and outspoken personage on the loose. When in July Foreign Minister Khaddam narrowly escaped death from a car bomb, suspicious souls said that this was Rifaat’s work. To Asad’s great anger Rifaat was also reported to have met Yasir ‘Arafat in Geneva. And when it was learned that Rifaat was planning to publish an anti-regime magazine in France and even to start a radio station, Damascus decided it was time to bring him home.
Rifaat still retained the title of vice-president and Asad himself never publicly condemned him, leaving in the public mind a continuing uncertainty about the real nature of their relations. On 10 November 1984 a presidential decree entrusted Rifaat with the supervision of national security - making him in theory the overlord of all his rivals, and on the 26th he returned to Damascus, called at the presidency, and knelt and kissed at his brother’s hand. But he had not been forgiven. His security job was a sham. He was prevented from renewing contact with his slimmed down Defence Companies and he was hemmed in everywhere he turned. It was painful for a man who had once enjoyed unfettered power to find himself so constrained.
The long-drawn-out struggle between the brothers was brought to its formal conclusion at the Eighth Regional Congress of the Baath party held in Damascus from 5 to 20 January 1985, and attended by 780 delegates from across the country. Rifaat, as a member of the Regional Command, was present, but he was also in a sense in the dock and was exposed to a good deal of criticism. Everyone at the Congress knew how narrowly Syria had escaped fratricidal strife, and to whom they owed renewed serenity.
Party rules stipulated that the Congress elect a Central Committee - hitherto of seventy-five members, now expanded to ninety. These men in turn had the task of electing the new Regional Command, the highest pinnacle of party power. But at the Eighth Congress the rule book was laid aside: Asad, master of the external and internal scene, victor of the struggle for Lebanon and of the succession crisis, was by acclamation awarded special powers. In recognition of his unchallenged personal pre-eminence the delegates entrusted him with the task of personally naming the ninety Central Committee members. It was a gesture of confidence in the political wizard who had checked the slide into civil war. Benignly, Asad sat through every session of the Congress, enjoying his apotheosis. Three weeks later, on 10 February 1985, he was elected president of Syria for a third seven-year term by 99,97 per cent of the voters.
Asad had triumphed, but in the crisis the institutions of his state had made a poor showing. At the moment of danger he had to go down into the street himself and clear the ranks away. Checks, balances, the People’s Assembly, the Popular Organizations, indeed the party itself with its extensive structure in both the country and the army, were all of no avail when ambitious generals threatened to shoot it out. In the end it was his personal authority and that alone which held the country together. He was the only pole holding up the tent. It was not a good augury for the future.
Meanwhile Rifaat took off again for Europe, his hope of rehabilitation dashed. Asad’s severity toward his brother did not abate. Although he was attached to Rifaat and owed him a lot, the defence of the political line to which he was committed overrode sentiment or family attachment. He remained convinced that his brother had, wittingly or not, been involved with foreign powers in an attempted coup against him and against his policies, and this he could not let pass.
In May 1986 Rifaat (who by this time had established himself in Paris in the splendour associated with exiled royalty) paid an unannounced visit to Britain. He was preceded by four armed bodyguards carrying Moroccan passports whom the British authorities quietly detained. Then two private planes landed at Heathrow carrying Rifaat, members of his family, retainers and security men, some forty people in all. Many of these too traveled on Moroccan passports. The British government allowed the party in, but a message was sent to the Syrian government through diplomatic channels requesting clarification of the visitors’ status. Asad’s response was swift: ‘We expect Britain to behave correctly towards holders of valid Syrian passports. What Britain does with holders of other passports is no concern of ours.’
Mr. Patrick Seale, you are intelligent...
Seale quoted the corrupt officials he met as saying that the brigadier-general left heaped with curses, but in order to show them that their game and the regime’s were given away, he immediately added saying that the brigadier-general’s departure meant the regime banished its scapegoat. Perhaps the last expression sums up the regime’s aim of conspiring against the brigadier-general.
But the following question is raised. What made Patrick Seale thrust the concept of scapegoat while his entire account revolves around a man who was said to conspire against the regime in his country to overthrow it? The conspirator is normally punished and he is not called a scapegoat!
We reply by saying that, in addition to the fact that a wise man like Seale cannot be fooled by the accusations of conspiracy leveled by the regime against Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad, his careful examination of the Syrian regime’s desperate struggle to stay in power led him to believe that no reason made such a regime give up its strongest commander and destroy the strongest of its military forces unless this measure guaranteed or consolidated the continuity of the regime. Perhaps Patrick Seale reached the conclusion that accusing the brigadier-general of organizing a conspiracy was only a fake pretext the regime resorted to provoke the hostility of public opinion against him and to blame him for the misdeeds as well. Third, those two matters ensured the presentation of a legal personality like Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad as a scapegoat for the regime’s misdeeds.
A number of political figures and leaders had already reached this conclusion before Patrick Seale did. They wondered why the Syrian regime relinquished its strongest arm. Can the answer be found in Machiavelli’s The Prince?
Let us clarify the issue. We recall the difficult period that Syria, both the regime and the people, went through during the three years that ran from 1979 to 1982. Not a day passed without news on casualties resulting from the clashes between the authorities and the outlaws. Like in any fierce civil war, these clashes led to the death of hundreds of innocent victims and fuelled rage in the Syrian street, thus adding to the already existing rage brought about by the suppression of freedoms and the imposition of the emergency law. Add to this the regime misguided foreign policy that embroiled Syria in enmity towards the international community. Attempting to find a way out, the regime believed that the people would forgive all its sins if it offered them a valuable scapegoat.
The scapegoat was carefully chosen. But the visible process was preceded by a systematic defamation of the trajectory followed by the brigadier-general so that he would be later portrayed as the person responsible for all the mistakes mentioned above and as the only person behind the chaos the country was thrown into. A special division in the military intelligence was affiliated to the presidential palace and had no other job than fuelling the rumors that disgraced Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad, and paving the way for public approval or encouragement of any plot targeting him. The author referred to Hafez Jamali’s book and Saadallah Wannous’ play, activities not authorized in Syria unless they had the consent of the security apparatuses.
The brigadier-general was aware of this reality. In this video he describes how the parties who were determined to defame him even went as far as tackling personal issues.
Seale quoted the corrupt officials he met as saying that the brigadier-general left heaped with curses, but in order to show them that their game and the regime’s were given away, he immediately added saying that the brigadier-general’s departure meant the regime banished its scapegoat. Perhaps the last expression sums up the regime’s aim of conspiring against the brigadier-general.
But the following question is raised. What made Patrick Seale thrust the concept of scapegoat while his entire account revolves around a man who was said to conspire against the regime in his country to overthrow it? The conspirator is normally punished and he is not called a scapegoat!
We reply by saying that, in addition to the fact that a wise man like Seale cannot be fooled by the accusations of conspiracy leveled by the regime against Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad, his careful examination of the Syrian regime’s desperate struggle to stay in power led him to believe that no reason made such a regime give up its strongest commander and destroy the strongest of its military forces unless this measure guaranteed or consolidated the continuity of the regime. Perhaps Patrick Seale reached the conclusion that accusing the brigadier-general of organizing a conspiracy was only a fake pretext the regime resorted to provoke the hostility of public opinion against him and to blame him for the misdeeds as well. Third, those two matters ensured the presentation of a legal personality like Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad as a scapegoat for the regime’s misdeeds.
A number of political figures and leaders had already reached this conclusion before Patrick Seale did. They wondered why the Syrian regime relinquished its strongest arm. Can the answer be found in Machiavelli’s The Prince?
Let us clarify the issue. We recall the difficult period that Syria, both the regime and the people, went through during the three years that ran from 1979 to 1982. Not a day passed without news on casualties resulting from the clashes between the authorities and the outlaws. Like in any fierce civil war, these clashes led to the death of hundreds of innocent victims and fuelled rage in the Syrian street, thus adding to the already existing rage brought about by the suppression of freedoms and the imposition of the emergency law. Add to this the regime misguided foreign policy that embroiled Syria in enmity towards the international community. Attempting to find a way out, the regime believed that the people would forgive all its sins if it offered them a valuable scapegoat.
The scapegoat was carefully chosen. But the visible process was preceded by a systematic defamation of the trajectory followed by the brigadier-general so that he would be later portrayed as the person responsible for all the mistakes mentioned above and as the only person behind the chaos the country was thrown into. A special division in the military intelligence was affiliated to the presidential palace and had no other job than fuelling the rumors that disgraced Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad, and paving the way for public approval or encouragement of any plot targeting him. The author referred to Hafez Jamali’s book and Saadallah Wannous’ play, activities not authorized in Syria unless they had the consent of the security apparatuses.
The brigadier-general was aware of this reality. In this video he describes how the parties who were determined to defame him even went as far as tackling personal issues.
Therefore, people were hit with an iron fist and the party that would bear the responsibility was ready! This was the purpose of writing The Prince.
Mr. Seale, as a clever author, gave the game away when he said, “In the public perception, his misdeeds highlighted Asad’s virtues.”
Those were not certainly the only reasons behind choosing Brigadier-General Assad to be the regime scapegoat. Major-General Ali Haydar or another figure would have been chosen. But there were other reasons that Machiavelli’s book did not take into consideration, So the Syrian regime tailored Machiavelli’s ideas to its own vision and modified it to fulfill the following objectives. First, plotting against the promoters of freedom for their people and of their constitutional right to elect their president; second, blaming all the regime mistakes on these promoters and disavowing them; and third, removing all real and potential obstacles in the heir’s path.
These would have been the three benefits gained by the regime from ousting Brigadier-General Assad, had it not been for destiny’s intervention this time to make the president’s brother the scapegoat. Thus, a fourth benefit was derived when the plots made against the brigadier-general were meant to be a message to other leaders, to the effect that if the president did this to his brother, what action was he going to take against anyone daring to object to his ruling pattern?!
Mr. Seale, as a clever author, gave the game away when he said, “In the public perception, his misdeeds highlighted Asad’s virtues.”
Those were not certainly the only reasons behind choosing Brigadier-General Assad to be the regime scapegoat. Major-General Ali Haydar or another figure would have been chosen. But there were other reasons that Machiavelli’s book did not take into consideration, So the Syrian regime tailored Machiavelli’s ideas to its own vision and modified it to fulfill the following objectives. First, plotting against the promoters of freedom for their people and of their constitutional right to elect their president; second, blaming all the regime mistakes on these promoters and disavowing them; and third, removing all real and potential obstacles in the heir’s path.
These would have been the three benefits gained by the regime from ousting Brigadier-General Assad, had it not been for destiny’s intervention this time to make the president’s brother the scapegoat. Thus, a fourth benefit was derived when the plots made against the brigadier-general were meant to be a message to other leaders, to the effect that if the president did this to his brother, what action was he going to take against anyone daring to object to his ruling pattern?!
Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad left for Geneva and from there he started to work on consolidating Arab ranks in support of the Palestinian cause and as a challenge to Iranian ambitions in the Arab World. He launched a number of newspapers and magazines that focus on democracy and human rights in the Arab World, and shed light on the suffering of the Arab masses. The publications included Majallat Al-Shaab Al-Arabi (The Magazine of the Arab People), Minbar Hurr (A Free Forum), published in Arabic, English, and French, and Al-Fursan (The Kinghts) magazine, established in 1967.
During his stay in Geneva, he held tens of meetings with Arab and European presidents and officials who expressed their hope that he would go back to Syria.
At that time, Syria was plunged into turmoil resulting from the clashes between the regime and thousands of the brigadier-general’s supporters. The turmoil coincided with widespread popular discontent due to the rise in the prices of food items and the unavailability of a number of groceries in the market because of the traders’ monopoly, assisted by corrupt officials.
On the other hand, violent clashes erupted between the Syrian regime and the residents of the Sumariyya residential complex where thousands of the families of the Defense Brigades officers and soldiers live. The clashes broke out because of the regime’s dismissal of thousands of officers and soldiers and warning them to vacate their homes without providing substitutes. The residents revolted in protests against such arbitrary measures and violent clashes broke out between them and the authorities. They expressed their anger by burning tires and closing the road leading to Al- Sumariyya, and after a series of confrontations causing heavy casualties the residents managed to expel the regime forces outside the boundary of the residential complex. Driven by a customary chivalry, Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad sent a messenger to the residents to ask them to cooperate with the authorities until he went back home. At the same time, Syria began to experience more serious crises, especially with respect to its relations with the US, France, and many Arab states. French anger was flaring up because of Syria’s blatant interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs. And when the Syrian regime sent President François Mitterand an invitation to visit Syria, the French president immediately met with the brigadier-general and discussed with him the invitation. Mitterand assured him that he would not visit Syria unless he was there and urged him to return.
President Assad sought help from Brigadier-General Assad and sent the late Bassel Al-Assad and Mrs. Bushra Al-Assad to their uncle to beg him to interfere and go back to Syria according to his own conditions. They also meant to assure him that the president agreed about the reforms he had suggested. A few days later the president appointed the brigadier-general as Head of the National Security Agency, in addition to his position as vice-president.
Due to mediation efforts made by Arab heads of state and officials and by the French president, along with the visit paid by Bassel and Bushra Al-Assad, for all these reasons, Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad agreed to return to Syria to give the regime another chance and to test its seriousness about initiating reforms.
When he arrived at the airport, hundreds of thousands had been waiting to welcome him. They included Syrian citizens and over 30,000 knights from the Defense Brigades who had gathered on the road leading to Damascus International Airport to greet him. The Defense Brigades knights kept firing nonstop for three consecutive days.
The brigadier-general went to the presidential palace to meet the president, but we don’t know where Patrick Seale brought the word kneeled from, because we, as Muslims, don’t kneel or prostrate ourselves except before God the Almighty. It is true that he kissed his elder brother’s hand in conformity with the traditions of the family he was raised in. Indeed, the late Hafez Al-Assad also used to kiss the hands of his elder brothers, a venerable tradition that we, as Arabs, boast of. This is an indicator of the brigadier-general’s high morals and his keenness on cementing family ties regardless of his disagreement with his brother, the president.
Despite the brigadier-general’s many reservations about the president’s way of dealing with his followers during his absence, he went back hoping to see the initiation of drastic domestic policy reforms aimed at improving the performance of the state apparatuses, upgrading the skills of its cadres, and speeding up the process of resolving the economic crisis the Syrian people were faced with at that time. Since his arrival, the brigadier-general worked on pacifying his followers and promised them that reforms would bring prosperity to all the Syrians.
In his capacity as Head of the National Security Agency to which all other security apparatuses were affiliated, Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad began to transfer some security officers. Yet, President Hafez Al-Assad asked him to cancel these transfer processes and keep things as they were. This prompted the brigadier-general to ask him how he could manage security at the country level if he was unable to transfer a single officer. The president replied by saying the officers were doing their job adequately and asked him to wait until after the party congress was held.
The congress that was actually held a couple of days later represented the greatest farce in Syria’s political life in the 20th century. Is it logical that one person appoints the members of the central committee that would in turn elect the regional command members?! Is it logical to reduce the ruling party with all its cadres and institutions to one person? Has anyone in the world heard of a person who wins 99,97% of the votes in an election? This marked the end of the Baath Party in practical terms, and no party congress was held until after President Assad’s death, when another farce took place. The constitution was violated through the amendment of one of its provisions to adjust it to the heir’s age!
After Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad witnessed the farce of the 1985 party congress and the 99,97% election result, he became convinced that the president was not serious about introducing any reforms whatsoever and that his only concern was to stay in power, surrounded by a bunch of docile officials who did nothing except fulfilling his wishes and carrying out his orders in return for being given free rein in other areas.
Dear readers, don’t be surprised at learning that Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas was unable to transfer an officer or a soldier unless the order was issued by the president. Tlas used to do anything except the tasks usually done by a minister of defense! The same applied to the rest of officials. For this reason, we never heard that a Syrian official was held accountable for neglect of duty; we rather heard of their promotion to higher positions!... The only instance that punishment was administered was when General Hikmat Al-Shihabi, Major General Mohammad Al-Khawli, and Major General Ali Haydar opposed bequeathing political power to Bashar Al-Assad. For the sake of accuracy, it was not conventional punishment we are familiar with, but rather a scandal implicating Shihabi, a rebuke for Khawli, placing Haydar under arrest, and the dismissal of all three.
As for civilian officials, we still recall the story of the late Mahmoud Al-Zu΄bi, the prime minister with the longest 13-year term after occupying the position of the President of the People’s Assembly. However, his activities had nothing to do with both as he simply obeyed the orders he received.
At that time, Syria was plunged into turmoil resulting from the clashes between the regime and thousands of the brigadier-general’s supporters. The turmoil coincided with widespread popular discontent due to the rise in the prices of food items and the unavailability of a number of groceries in the market because of the traders’ monopoly, assisted by corrupt officials.
On the other hand, violent clashes erupted between the Syrian regime and the residents of the Sumariyya residential complex where thousands of the families of the Defense Brigades officers and soldiers live. The clashes broke out because of the regime’s dismissal of thousands of officers and soldiers and warning them to vacate their homes without providing substitutes. The residents revolted in protests against such arbitrary measures and violent clashes broke out between them and the authorities. They expressed their anger by burning tires and closing the road leading to Al- Sumariyya, and after a series of confrontations causing heavy casualties the residents managed to expel the regime forces outside the boundary of the residential complex. Driven by a customary chivalry, Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad sent a messenger to the residents to ask them to cooperate with the authorities until he went back home. At the same time, Syria began to experience more serious crises, especially with respect to its relations with the US, France, and many Arab states. French anger was flaring up because of Syria’s blatant interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs. And when the Syrian regime sent President François Mitterand an invitation to visit Syria, the French president immediately met with the brigadier-general and discussed with him the invitation. Mitterand assured him that he would not visit Syria unless he was there and urged him to return.
President Assad sought help from Brigadier-General Assad and sent the late Bassel Al-Assad and Mrs. Bushra Al-Assad to their uncle to beg him to interfere and go back to Syria according to his own conditions. They also meant to assure him that the president agreed about the reforms he had suggested. A few days later the president appointed the brigadier-general as Head of the National Security Agency, in addition to his position as vice-president.
Due to mediation efforts made by Arab heads of state and officials and by the French president, along with the visit paid by Bassel and Bushra Al-Assad, for all these reasons, Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad agreed to return to Syria to give the regime another chance and to test its seriousness about initiating reforms.
When he arrived at the airport, hundreds of thousands had been waiting to welcome him. They included Syrian citizens and over 30,000 knights from the Defense Brigades who had gathered on the road leading to Damascus International Airport to greet him. The Defense Brigades knights kept firing nonstop for three consecutive days.
The brigadier-general went to the presidential palace to meet the president, but we don’t know where Patrick Seale brought the word kneeled from, because we, as Muslims, don’t kneel or prostrate ourselves except before God the Almighty. It is true that he kissed his elder brother’s hand in conformity with the traditions of the family he was raised in. Indeed, the late Hafez Al-Assad also used to kiss the hands of his elder brothers, a venerable tradition that we, as Arabs, boast of. This is an indicator of the brigadier-general’s high morals and his keenness on cementing family ties regardless of his disagreement with his brother, the president.
Despite the brigadier-general’s many reservations about the president’s way of dealing with his followers during his absence, he went back hoping to see the initiation of drastic domestic policy reforms aimed at improving the performance of the state apparatuses, upgrading the skills of its cadres, and speeding up the process of resolving the economic crisis the Syrian people were faced with at that time. Since his arrival, the brigadier-general worked on pacifying his followers and promised them that reforms would bring prosperity to all the Syrians.
In his capacity as Head of the National Security Agency to which all other security apparatuses were affiliated, Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad began to transfer some security officers. Yet, President Hafez Al-Assad asked him to cancel these transfer processes and keep things as they were. This prompted the brigadier-general to ask him how he could manage security at the country level if he was unable to transfer a single officer. The president replied by saying the officers were doing their job adequately and asked him to wait until after the party congress was held.
The congress that was actually held a couple of days later represented the greatest farce in Syria’s political life in the 20th century. Is it logical that one person appoints the members of the central committee that would in turn elect the regional command members?! Is it logical to reduce the ruling party with all its cadres and institutions to one person? Has anyone in the world heard of a person who wins 99,97% of the votes in an election? This marked the end of the Baath Party in practical terms, and no party congress was held until after President Assad’s death, when another farce took place. The constitution was violated through the amendment of one of its provisions to adjust it to the heir’s age!
After Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad witnessed the farce of the 1985 party congress and the 99,97% election result, he became convinced that the president was not serious about introducing any reforms whatsoever and that his only concern was to stay in power, surrounded by a bunch of docile officials who did nothing except fulfilling his wishes and carrying out his orders in return for being given free rein in other areas.
Dear readers, don’t be surprised at learning that Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas was unable to transfer an officer or a soldier unless the order was issued by the president. Tlas used to do anything except the tasks usually done by a minister of defense! The same applied to the rest of officials. For this reason, we never heard that a Syrian official was held accountable for neglect of duty; we rather heard of their promotion to higher positions!... The only instance that punishment was administered was when General Hikmat Al-Shihabi, Major General Mohammad Al-Khawli, and Major General Ali Haydar opposed bequeathing political power to Bashar Al-Assad. For the sake of accuracy, it was not conventional punishment we are familiar with, but rather a scandal implicating Shihabi, a rebuke for Khawli, placing Haydar under arrest, and the dismissal of all three.
As for civilian officials, we still recall the story of the late Mahmoud Al-Zu΄bi, the prime minister with the longest 13-year term after occupying the position of the President of the People’s Assembly. However, his activities had nothing to do with both as he simply obeyed the orders he received.
Seeing that some people were taking advantage of public spoils free from surveillance or accountability, this poor guy followed suit unaware that his moves and activities were under close monitoring and documentation for over 20 years. He could have stayed in office had he not been chosen to be the first scapegoat that Bashar trained in and let it be a lesson for others. President Hafez Al-Assad ordered the intelligence agencies to refer corruption files relative to the late Zu΄bi to his son Bashar so that he would expose them to the public.
Then, other officials among Zu΄bi’s peers realized that they had files similar to his own kept by the intelligence services and that all they could do to protect themselves was to support Bashar and testify to the soundness of his opinion, his deep insight, his leadership abilities, and certainly his political wisdom!
Then, other officials among Zu΄bi’s peers realized that they had files similar to his own kept by the intelligence services and that all they could do to protect themselves was to support Bashar and testify to the soundness of his opinion, his deep insight, his leadership abilities, and certainly his political wisdom!
It was said that Zu΄bi committed suicide later, thus bringing the curtain down on him and his past. As for the reason behind not opening his files earlier, it was because the time had not been ripe yet.
Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad left Syria once again although the president begged him to stay by his side and asked him to enjoy his life there. But he was determined not to share in these farces and not to shoulder the responsibility for their effect on the Syrian people. Yet, we now see the consequences of these farces with our own eyes.
Now we come to the president’s victory! By God, Mr. Seale, what victory are you talking about while you personally said that all the state institutions, including the People’s Assembly, popular organizations, and the party with its broad based structure proved to be useless when the country faced a crisis?
In reply to Seale’s statement that Assad’s personal authority held the country together, we say that it was exactly this point that the brigadier-general opposed as he has always objected to the fact that the country is built on a single man, and once he collapses all the state institutions will collapse along with him.
No doubt, what triumphed, Mr. Seale, was the brigadier-general’s love and loyalty to his brother. Dear readers, you now realize that all the state institutions, including the army, were unable to resist in the face of a single brigade from the Defense Brigades, otherwise the president did not have to personally go down into the street and clear the tanks away, as Mr. Seale said!
During the brigadier-general’s stay in Syria and as a result of his pacification of his followers, the president and his regime heaved a deep sigh. But after he left Syria, the president ordered the arrest of the Defense Brigades commanders and their stripping of their military ranks. While hundreds of soldiers and thousands of soldiers were also dismissed, he wished he could banish them to another planet. As for the rest of the officers and soldiers, they were transferred to the other army units after they had been forced to sign pledges of allegiance to President Hafez Al-Assad, and to abstain from referring to the Defense Brigades and their commander. Those who would refrain from signing this pledge were threatened with imprisonment and with family displacement through deprivation of housing in military compounds, a privilege enjoyed by the Defense Brigades soldiers exclusively. This marked the demise of the Defense Brigades from a theoretical perspective.
However, the Defense Brigades commander remained practically the symbol of dignity and pride in Syria despite all the misrepresentation that targeted the life and achievements of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad. The Defense Brigades soldiers have also remained loyal to their beloved commander and ready to obey his orders.
Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad left Syria once again although the president begged him to stay by his side and asked him to enjoy his life there. But he was determined not to share in these farces and not to shoulder the responsibility for their effect on the Syrian people. Yet, we now see the consequences of these farces with our own eyes.
Now we come to the president’s victory! By God, Mr. Seale, what victory are you talking about while you personally said that all the state institutions, including the People’s Assembly, popular organizations, and the party with its broad based structure proved to be useless when the country faced a crisis?
In reply to Seale’s statement that Assad’s personal authority held the country together, we say that it was exactly this point that the brigadier-general opposed as he has always objected to the fact that the country is built on a single man, and once he collapses all the state institutions will collapse along with him.
No doubt, what triumphed, Mr. Seale, was the brigadier-general’s love and loyalty to his brother. Dear readers, you now realize that all the state institutions, including the army, were unable to resist in the face of a single brigade from the Defense Brigades, otherwise the president did not have to personally go down into the street and clear the tanks away, as Mr. Seale said!
During the brigadier-general’s stay in Syria and as a result of his pacification of his followers, the president and his regime heaved a deep sigh. But after he left Syria, the president ordered the arrest of the Defense Brigades commanders and their stripping of their military ranks. While hundreds of soldiers and thousands of soldiers were also dismissed, he wished he could banish them to another planet. As for the rest of the officers and soldiers, they were transferred to the other army units after they had been forced to sign pledges of allegiance to President Hafez Al-Assad, and to abstain from referring to the Defense Brigades and their commander. Those who would refrain from signing this pledge were threatened with imprisonment and with family displacement through deprivation of housing in military compounds, a privilege enjoyed by the Defense Brigades soldiers exclusively. This marked the demise of the Defense Brigades from a theoretical perspective.
However, the Defense Brigades commander remained practically the symbol of dignity and pride in Syria despite all the misrepresentation that targeted the life and achievements of Brigadier-General Rifaat Al-Assad. The Defense Brigades soldiers have also remained loyal to their beloved commander and ready to obey his orders.